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ABSTRACT
The appearance of dynamic distributed networks in early eighties of the last century has
evoked technologies like pervasive systems, ubiquitous computing, ambient intelligence,
and more recently, Internet of Things (IoT) to be developed. Moreover, sensing capabil-
ities embedded in computing devices offer users the ability to share, retrieve, and update
resources on anytime and anywhere basis. These resources (or data) constitute what is
widely known as contextual information. In these systems, there is an association between
a system and its environment and the system should always adapt to its ever-changing en-
vironment. This situation makes the Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) the method of
choice for such environments. However, most traditional policy models do not address the
issue of dynamic nature of dynamic distributed systems and are limited in addressing issues
like adaptability, extensibility, and reasoning over security policies. We propose a security
framework for dynamic distributed network domain that is based on semantic technologies.
This framework presents a flexible and adaptable context-based access control authoriza-
tion model for protecting dynamic distributed networks’ resources. We extend our secu-
rity model to incorporate context delegation in context-based access control environments.
We show that security mechanisms provided by the framework are sound and adhere to
the least-privilege principle. We develop a prototype implementation of our framework
and present the results to show that our framework correctly derives Context-Based au-
thorization decision. Furthermore, we provide complexity analysis for the authorization
framework in its response to the requests and contrast the complexity against possible op-
timization that can be applied on the framework. Finally, we incorporate semantic-based
obligation into our security framework.
v
In phase I of our research, we design two lightweight Web Ontology Language (OWL)
ontologies CTX-Lite and CBAC. CTX-Lite ontology serves as a core ontology for context
handling, while CBAC ontology is used for modeling access control policy requirements.
Based on the two OWL ontologies, we develop access authorization approach in which
access decision is solely made based on the context of the request. We separate context
operations from access authorization operations to reduce processing time for distributed
networks’ devices. In phase II, we present two novel ontology-based context delegation ap-
proaches. Monotonic context delegation, which adopts GRANT version of delegation, and
non-monotonic for TRANSFER version of delegation. Our goal is to present context del-
egation mechanisms that can be adopted by existing CBAC systems which do not provide
delegation services. Phase III has two sub-phases, the first is to provide complexity anal-
ysis of the authorization framework. The second sub-phase is dedicated to incorporating
semantic-based obligation.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Dynamic distributed networks are a class of distributed computing architectures in which
heterogeneous and mobile devices are connected in such a way that intelligence can be
embedded in the devices themselves [71]. This can further enhance the power of the net-
work by developing information processing capabilities to the nodes of the network. Such
architectures are the basis of "smart" context-aware and self-adapting systems, often sum-
marized by terms like pervasive systems, ubiquitous computing, ambient intelligence, or
the Internet of Things (IoT). However, most traditional policy models do not take into ac-
count the dynamic nature of dynamic distributed systems and are limited in addressing
issues like adaptability, extensibility, and reasoning over security policies. To illustrate
these advancements in network world and link them to incompetence of the traditional
security policy models, consider the following motivating example, Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Dynamic distributed network.
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Example 1.1. Martha is a 55-year old woman and she has health problems, such as hy-
pertension and heart arrhythmia. She uses a wearable smart device with heartbeat and
blood pressure monitors embedded in it. The device transmits its data along with the time
of sampling and the device’s geo-spatial coordinates as continuous streams to a nearby
smart phone. The health monitoring application running on Martha’s smart phone trans-
mits the received data to the health agency’s server. The health agency server uses these
data items to continually monitor Martha’s health status. In case of a situation that may
be an emergency, the health agency will 1.) Alerts 911 and transmits Martha’s location
and status; and 2.) Contacts Martha to verify her condition. Assume that Martha has a
severe drop in her heartbeat (below 55 beats per minute). If she would have been resting,
this drop of the heart beat could have been normal. However, in the context of aerobic
exercise at the location of the gym room, this is an emergency situation. In an emergency,
a first responder, Bob, after getting notified by the health agency server, should be able to
log into Martha’s health data so that he can provide her the necessary first aid care until
she is transferred to emergency room.
Example 1.1 illustrates the need for context in life-threatening situations and it also
show inability of the traditional access control model to cope with advancements happening
in networking technologies.
1.1 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The advent of dynamic distributed networks accompanied with heterogeneous devices and
connection interfaces, mobile users, devices and services and the variability of interaction
conditions such as location and user preferences, has introduced new security challenges.
These security challenges are due to the variety and mobility of the network devices and
the changing context of the requests. In addition, there are unique end-user preferences
and needs which should be reflected on the access control system. Contextual information
2
is dynamic during communication sessions. In such dynamic environments, an effective
Access Control (AC) solution for network devices should be context-aware.
Access control policy should be adaptable to the changes of individual and the environ-
ment contextual attributes and should consider not only the identity of the entity requesting
an access to sensitive resources, but the context of the request. The scope of our work is
centered around answering three main questions:
• How semantic-based technologies can be used to formally model domain knowledge
of dynamic distributed networks?
• How ontologies, combined with logic programming rules, can be used to support
adaptive and flexible access control decisions?
• What is the impact of the increasing number of rules on the performance of the
authorization framework?
• How semantic-based mechanisms can be applied to provide more specialized security-
based mechanisms such as delegation and obligation in dynamic networks?
1.2 RESEARCH TASKS
In this dissertation, we address the following three major research tasks that contributes to
the research area of semantic context-based access control policy in highly dynamic and
distributed networks:
1. Constructing a Semantic Context-Based Authorization Framework (SCBAF): The
goal of this task is to use ontologies and logic programming rules to support flex-
ible and adaptive access authorization decisions for dynamic distributed network’s
resources. For this task, we:
(i) explore publications and best practices related to semantic context-based autho-
rization, domain knowledge ontologies, and authorization policies.
3
(ii) develop a formal specification for the SCBAF. We establish the formal framework
of the context and the access authorization model using Description Logic (DL) and
Logic Programming (LP) standards.
(iii) develop a software application that supports access authorization based on se-
mantic reasoning over the domain knowledge.
(iv) present the complexity analysis of the authorization framework
- M. AL-Wahah and C. Farkas. "Context-Aware IoT Authorization: A Dynamic and
Adaptive Approach." In 13th International Conference for Internet Technology and
Secured Transactions. (ICITST-2018), pp. 64-72. Infonomics Society. London, UK
(2018).
- M. AL-Wahah and C. Farkas. "Semantic-Based Authorization: The Need for The
Context." Submitted to International Journal for Digital Society (IJDS).
2. Context Delegation: The goal of this task is to develop a semantic-based context
delegation approach for environments that use CBAC authorization presented in task
(1) above. For this task, we:
(i) present the formal specification of monotonic context delegation approach. The
approach provides a dynamic and adaptive context delegation that does not modify
the original policy rules.
(ii) develop a software application that supports monotonic context delegation based
on semantic reasoning over the domain knowledge.
(iii) extend the monotonic context delegation to encompass non-monotonic delega-
tion for CBAC.
- M. AL-Wahah and C. Farkas: "Context Delegation for Context-Based Access Con-
trol." Published in: Proceedings of 2nd International Workshop on A.I. in Security
(IWAISe-2018), pp. 70-79. Dublin, Ireland (2018).
- M. AL-Wahah and C. Farkas: "Monotonic and Non-Monotonic Context Delega-
tion." Published in: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information
4
Systems Security and Privacy, Volume 1: (ICISSP-2019), pp. 449-460. Prague,
Czech Republic (2019).
3. Obligation: The goal of this task is to add a semantic-based obligation mechanism
via extending the framework presented in task (1) above. For this task, we:
(i) present the formal specification of obligation approach. The approach provides a
dynamic and adaptive verification of security obligation policies.
(ii) develop a software application that supports obligation based on semantic rea-
soning over the domain knowledge.
- M. AL-Wahah and C. Farkas: "Semantic-based obligation for Context-Based Ac-
cess Control". To be submitted.
1.3 DISSERTATION OUTLINES
This dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces the background information required for understanding this
proposal. It provides information on semantic web technologies in general, and De-
scription Logics (DL) and Web Ontology Language (OWL), in particular.
• Chapter 3 reviews existing works related to this proposal.
• In Chapter 4, we present our dynamic and adaptive semantic-based context-based
authorization model.
• Chapter 5 presents, based on the work of the previous chapter, the challenge of con-
text delegation within Context-Based Access Control environments and how our ap-
proach solves this issue.
• Chapter 6 extends our semantic-based model by including obligation.
• Chapter 7 provides conclusions and future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
In this chapter, the reader is introduced to the logic formalisms necessary to understand
the technical contributions of this work. It is divided into three sections. The first section,
section 2.1, is dedicated to semantic knowledge representation using description logics.
Section 2.2 discusses reasoning process in Description Logic (DL) and Logic Programming
(LP). In section 2.3, we introduce a brief explanation of Semantic Web Technologies.
2.1 KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION USING DESCRIPTION LOGICS
Knowledge Representation (KR) is a branch of Artificial Intelligence (AI) with the goal
of representing knowledge in such a way that computers can process and use it efficiently.
Several formalisms with different expressiveness and reasoning capabilities and of different
complexities are available. This includes propositional logic, First-Order Logic (FOL),
Semantic Networks, conceptual graphs, Semantic Web Standards RDF, RDFS, OWL, etc.
[74].
Description Logics (DLs) are a family of knowledge representation languages that have
been introduced in late seventies and began to gain popularity due to its adoption in the
semantic web, biomedical informatics, ontology-driven data access, data integration and
other several application domains [4, 29, 37, 74]. Each description logic describes a lan-
guage, and each language differs in expressivity versus reasoning complexity. This is due
to allowing or disallowing different constructors. Description logics languages share three
main properties:
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• They are decidable fragments of First-Order Logic (FOL),
• They depend what is called an Open-World-Assumption (OWA),
• They don not depend Unique-Name-Assumption (UNA).
The Knowledge Base (KB) in DL comprises two components (some references divide the
KB in DL into three components: TBox, ABox, and RBox for relational box, especially
when they refer to DL SROIQ(D) [39], the Terminological Box (TBox) and Assertional
Box (ABox). TBox defines the vocabulary of an application domain. ABox contains asser-
tions about named individuals in terms of TBox vocabulary. Basically, the TBox is a FOL
theory and the ABox is a set of ground facts.
The vocabulary of a DL language consists of concepts NC , which denote sets of indi-
viduals NI (instances), and roles NR that denote binary relationships between individuals.
Each member of DL family is determined by a set of constructors. Every constructor is
named by a single letter and a specific language dialect can be named by the concatenation
of all supported constructors.
A core description logic that serves as a basis for other DLs is the Attributive Language
with Complements (ALC) [63].
Definition 2.1. (ALC Syntax). Let NC , NI , NR be disjoint sets of concept names, individ-
ual names and role names, respectively. Each C,D ∈ NC are concept names (or concepts
only). Each a ∈ NI is an individual. Each R ∈ NR is a role name. Concept descriptions in
ALC are inductively defined as:
• Each C ∈ NC , > (top) and ⊥ (bottom) are concepts.
• For C,D ∈ NC , and R ∈ NR, then ¬C (complement), C uD (intersection), C unionsqD
(union), ∀R.C (value restriction), ∃R.C (existential quantification) are also concepts.
ALC is limited in its expressivity and hence it is often extended by adding additional
constructors to the ALC language. For example, Table 2.1 lists the constructors supported
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by the DL SROIQ(D). We should note that it is common to shortenALC (extended with
transitive roles) to just S for more advanced languages. The semantics of DL ontology is
Table 2.1: DL constructors.
Concept Constructor Constructor Symbol
Atomic concept C → A AL
Universal concept >
Bottom concept ⊥
Intersection u
Union unionsq
Value restriction ∀R.C
Limited existential quantification ∃R.>
Complement ¬C
Nominals {a} O
Qualified number restrictions (Cardinalities) ≥ R.C Q
≤ R.C
= R.C
Role Constructor
Role inclusion R ◦ S v R R
S ◦R v S
Role inverse R− I
Datatypes
Data type value, data type exists Data types used
are n (integer), s (string), f (float) ∀R.d D
ALC with transitive roles ∃R.d S
defined in terms of first-order interpretations, which are defined as follows:
Definition 2.2. (Interpretation). An interpretation I is given by ∆I and .I where ∆I is
called the domain, and .I is called the interpretation function. The domain is a non-empty
set and the interpretation function maps each concept name C ∈ NC to a set CI ⊆ ∆I ,
each constant (individual) a ∈ NI to an object aI ⊆ ∆I , and each role name R ∈ NR to a
binary relation RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I .
Hence individuals are mapped to elements of ∆I , concepts to subsets of ∆I , and roles
to subsets of ∆I ×∆I . Figure 2.1 depicts interpretation in DL.
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Figure 2.1: Interpretation in DL.
Table 2.2: Semantic Interpretations of DL SROIQ Constructors.
Constructor Semantics
> ∆I
⊥ ∅
¬C ∆I\CI
u CI ∩DI
unionsq CI ∪DI
{a} {aI}
∀R.C {x ∈ ∆I | < x, y >∈ RI =⇒ y ∈ CI}
∃R.C {x ∈ ∆I | for some y ∈ ∆I , < x, y >∈ RI =⇒ y ∈ CI}
∃S.Self {x ∈ ∆I | < x, x >∈ SI}
≥ nR.C {x ∈ ∆I |#{y ∈ ∆I < x, y >∈ RI and y ∈ CI} ≥ n}
≤ nR.C {x ∈ ∆I |#{y ∈ ∆I < x, y >∈ RI and y ∈ CI} ≤ n}
= nR.C {x ∈ ∆I |#{y ∈ ∆I < x, y >∈ RI and y ∈ CI} = n}
R− {(x, y) ∈ RI =⇒ (y, x) ∈ RI}
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Definition 2.3. (GCI) A general concept inclusion axiom (GCI) is an expression of the
form C1 v C2 where C1, C2 ∈ NC .
Definition 2.4. (CER) A concept equivalence relation (CER) is an expression of the form
C1 ≡ C2 where C1, C2 ∈ NC .
A TBox T is a finite set of GCIs and CERs.
2.2 REASONING IN DESCRIPTION LOGIC AND LOGIC PROGRAMMING
Reasoning in DL provides the following major tasks:
• Satisfiability: A concept C is satisfiable with respect to T if there exists a model I of
T such that CI is nonempty. In this case we say also that I is a model of C.
• Subsumption: A conceptC is subsumed by a conceptD with respect to T ifCI ⊆ DI
for every model I of T . In this case we write C vT D or T |= C v D.
• Equivalence: Two concepts C and D are equivalent with respect to T if CI = DI for
every model I of T . In this case we write C ≡> D or T |= C ≡ D.
• Disjointness: Two concepts C and D are disjoint with respect to T if CI ∩DI = ∅
for every model I of T .
Definition 2.5. (Monotonic reasoning). Let O1 and O2 two DL ontologies, and c is a DL
axiom. O1 entails c (equivalently, c is a logical consequence of O1), written as O1 |= c if
we have O2 ⊆ O1 and O2 |= c. In secure authorization terms, monotonic authorization
reasoning means that positive (and negative) authorizations will not be altered when new
facts are added into the knowledge base. Hence, what is previously inferred as a permitted
action still holds even after new facts are asserted (or inferred) into the knowledge base.
Definition 2.6. (Open World Assumption (OWA)) [37]). The Open World Assumption
is the assumption that what is not known to be true, is unknown. In OWA, absence of
10
information is interpreted as unknown information that may be added later. OWA assumes
incomplete information about a given state of affairs, which is useful for extending infor-
mation in an application such as ontology-based applications and Semantic Web.
Reasoning in DL is a monotonic process and it is strongly connected to the OWA.
Definition 2.7. (Closed World Assumption (CWA) [56]). Closed World Assumption is
the assumption that what is not known to be true is false. In CWA, absence of informa-
tion is interpreted as negative information. CWA assumes complete information about a
given state of affairs, which is useful for constraining information and validating data in an
application such as a relational database and Logic Programming.
Definition 2.8. (Non-Monotonic reasoning). LetKB1 andKB2 be two knowledge bases,
and c is a consequence. We may have that KB2 ⊆ KB1 and KB2 |=d c, but KB1 2d c.
In secure authorization terms, non-monotonic authorization reasoning means that positive
(and negative) authorizations may be altered when new facts are added into the knowledge
base. Hence, what is previously inferred as a permitted action may not hold when new facts
are asserted (or inferred) into the knowledge base.
Logic programming, as it depends on First-Order Logic (FOL) which is a form of Non-
Monotonic reasoning and it is strongly connected to the CWA.
For the sake of this dissertation, CWA is better suited for situation need this kind as-
sumptions since we need to capture who has access permission to a certain resource and
not the reverse. For example, the access authorization algorithm needs to know who has the
permission to access a certain resource but not all those who have not the access permission
to that resource. For this reason, we have used Jena forward chaining rules to assert access
authorization decisions and also for blocking delegation-based access permissions. Jena
rules are used to enforce the CWA after all semantic inferences are made.
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2.3 SEMANTIC WEB TECHNOLOGIES
Semantic Web Technologies are a set of tools, algorithms and solutions, see Figure 2.2,
that adhere to a specific set of W3C open technology standards. The Semantic Web is an
extension of the World Wide Web (WWW) that allows computers to intelligently search,
combine, and process Web content based on the semantic (meaning) [9]. The insight of Se-
mantic Web Technologies is to provide global integrating services via making information
computer-interpretable. This insight allows realizing the vision of autonomous comput-
ing [49], particularly in dynamic distributed networks where devices are expected to enter
and leave the environment constantly, mobile users (and their devices) are changing their
locations, and autonomous processes are executed.
Figure 2.2: Semantic Web Technologies.
Definition 2.9. (Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI)) URIs are used to identify resources
on the Web, for example, in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ABBA the identifier of the docu-
ment containing a textual description of music group ABBA. A URI starts with a scheme
name (e.g., http, ftp, tel, mailto) followed by additional information [77]. The URI is based
on ASCII character set and hence is limited to be used in Semantic Web.
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Figure 2.3: RDF graph example.
Definition 2.10. (Internationalized Resource Identifier (IRI)) An IRI within an RDF
graph is a Unicode string [UNICODE] that conforms to the syntax defined in RRFC 3987
[40] [IRI]. IRIs are a generalization of URIs. Every absolute URI and URL is an IRI.
2.3.1 RDF
The Resource Description Framework (RDF) is an XML language for representing meta-
data about Web resources [50]. RDF is used for situations in which this information needs
to be processed by machines rather than humans. RDF provides a common framework for
expressing this information so it can be exchanged between applications without loss of
meaning.
The idea behind using RDF is that Web resources are identified using URIs and those
URIs describe resources in terms of simple properties and property values. RDF properties
may be thought of as attributes of resources and in this sense correspond to traditional
attribute-value pairs. Attribute-value pairs can be represented as a graph of nodes and
edges representing the resources, their properties, and property values.
Example 2.11. Figure 2.2 shows an example of RDF graph.
The RDF is a set resulted from the union of three pairwise disjoint infinite sets of
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components: the setU of URI references, the set L of literals, and the set B of blanks. The
set U ∪ L is called the vocabulary.
Definition 2.12. (RDF Triple). Let U be the infinite set of URIs, B the infinite set of
blank nodes, and L the infinite set of literals. The RDF triple is defined as t = (s, p, o)∈
(U ∪B) ×U × (U ∪B× L), where s is a subject, p is a property and o is an object. An
RDF graph is a finite set of RDF triples.
Definition 2.13. (Triple Pattern). Let V be the infinite set of variables, then the triple
pattern, tp is defined as tp = (sp, pp, op)∈ (U ∪B ∪V) × (U ∪V) × (U ∪B× L ∪V).
The graph pattern is a set of triple patterns.
. We should note that RDF has no ability to describe the properties between resources
nor does it provide the means to describe the relationships between properties. Hence, RDF
is very limited in representing diverse knowledge bases and new knowledge representation
models are introduced.
2.3.2 SPARQL
SPARQL, Protocol and RDF Query Language, is a language used to query RDF graph pat-
tern (RDF databases or RDF dataset). SPARQL is designed for evaluating queries against
RDF graph patterns and is designed to handle complex-structured queries, typically over
data stored in RDF repositories.
2.3.2.1 SPARQL QUERIES
SPARQL Queries are defined, according to Pérez et. al [55] as follows: First, A SPARQL
graph pattern is recursively defined as:
• a triple pattern is a graph pattern;
• a graph pattern is a graph pattern;
14
• if P and P ′ are graph patterns, then (P.P ′), (P OPTIONAL P ′) and (P UNION
P ′) are graph patterns;
• if P is a graph pattern and F is a FILTER expression, then (P FILTER F ) is a
graph pattern;
• if P is a graph pattern and G ∈ (U ∪ V ), then (GRAPH G P ) is a graph pattern;
• For any pattern P , vars(P ) is the set of variables occurring in P .
The SPARQL query syntax consists of Select clause identifying the variables to be bound,
a Where clause which is used to match a subgraph and, optional From and FromNamed
clauses that are used to target a specific graph (or more graphs).
Example 2.14. The following SPARQL query is used to find all the people in Tim Berners-
Lee’s FOAF1 file that have names and email addresses. Return each person’s name and
email address (http://www.w3.org/2009/Talks/0615-qbe):
Prefix foaf : < http : //xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ >
Select ?name, ?email
Where {
?person foaf : name ?name.
?person foaf : mbox ?email.
}
The results returned by this query are shown in Table 2.3. We should note that we can
use multiple triple patterns to retrieve multiple properties about a particular resource. In
the above SPARQL query example Select ?name, ?email selects the variables ?name and
1Friend-Of-A Friend is very well known
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Table 2.3: Results of SPARQL query.
name email
"Karl Dubost" <mailto:karl@w3.org>
"Amy van der Hiel" <mailto:amy@w3.org>
"Edd Dumbill" <mailto:edd@xmlhack.com>
"Dean Jackson" <mailto:dean@w3.org>
"Edd Dumbill" <mailto:edd@usefulinc.com>
"Aaron Swartz" <mailto:me@aaronsw.com>
"Timothy Berners-Lee" <mailto:timbl@w3.org>
"Eric Miller" <mailto:em@w3.org>
"Edd Dumbill" <mailto:edd@xml.com>
"Dean Jackson" <mailto:dino@grorg.org>
"Libby Miller" <mailto:libby.miller@bristol.ac.uk>
"Dan Connolly" <mailto:connolly@w3.org>
?email mentioned in the query where the prefix http : //www.w3.org/People/Berners−
Lee/card represents the dataset over which the query is applied.
2.3.3 RDFS
The Resource Description Framework Schema (RDFS) provides a data-modeling vocab-
ulary for RDF data. RDF Schema is an extension of the basic RDF vocabulary. RDFS
presents mechanisms for describing groups of related resources and the relationships be-
tween these resources. RDF Schema is written in RDF using the terms described in this
document. These resources are used to determine characteristics of other resources, such
as the domains and ranges of properties.
Like RDF, the expressivity of RDFS is restricted to simple class and property definitions
and class and property subsumption. For instance, it does not allow us to define a class as
the complement of another class or the union or intersection of other classes. This is why
more expressive languages, based on Description Logics, have been developed.
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2.3.4 WEB ONTOLOGY LANGUAGE (OWL)
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) developed and recommended the Web Ontology
Language (OWL) as the standard ontology language for the Semantic Web. OWL is based
on DL which provides the formal background, specifically for OWL-DL and OWL Lite.
2.3.4.1 OWL FULL
OWL Full also uses all the OWL language primitives, but has the fewest restrictions. It
allows arbitrary combination of OWL primitives with RDF and RDFS which means that
every RDFS ontology is an OWL-Full ontology. However, this level of expressiveness is
at the expense of decidability.
2.3.4.2 OWL-DL
OWL DL is short for OWL Description Logic. It is a sub-language of OWL Full and has
restrictions about how the constructs from OWL and RDF can be used. The restrictions are
as follows:
• No arbitrary combination is allowed: Any resource can be only a class, a data type, a
data type property, an object property, an instance, or a data value, and not more than
one of these. In other words, a class cannot be at the same time a member of another
class.
• Restrictions on functional property and inverse functional property: These two prop-
erties are subclasses of rdf:Property; therefore, they can connect resource to resource
or resource to value. However, in OWL DL, they can only be used with the object
property, and not with the datatype property.
• Restriction on transitive property: You cannot use owl:cardinality with the transi-
tive property, or their sub-properties; these sub-properties are transitive properties by
implication.
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• Restriction on owl:imports: If we are developing an OWL DL ontology but are also
using owl:imports to import an OWL Full ontology, our ontology will not be qualified
as an OWL DL.
• The advantage of OWL DL is that it permits a quicker response from the reasoning
engine and, also, the reasoning engine itself is easier to build. The disadvantage is
that we do not have the expressiveness or the convenience provided by OWL Full.
2.3.4.3 OWL LITE
OWL Lite is a further restricted subset of OWL DL. For example, the following constructs
are not allowed in OWL Lite: owl:hasValue, owl:disjointWith, owl:unionOf, owl:complem-
-entOf, and owl:oneOf. Also, cardinality constraints are more restricted, because we cannot
use owl:minCardinality or owl:maxCardinality. However, we can still use owl:cardinality,
but the value is restricted to either 0 or 1. Moreover, owl:equivalentClass statement can
no longer be used to relate anonymous classes, but only to connect class identifiers. The
advantage is again efficiency on the reasoning side, both for the users and the tool builders.
The disadvantage is, of course, the loss of even more expressive power.
2.3.5 SEMANTIC WEB RULE LANGUAGE (SWRL)
SWRL is essentially based on OWL rule languages which adds the power to write down
Horn like rules in terms of OWL concepts, roles and datatypes to OWL ontologies. It has
a sound reasoning capability with the OWL.
Definition 2.15. (Horn Clause) A Horn clause H is a rule of the form:
H ← B1 ∧B2 ∧ ... ∧Bn (2.1)
where atom H is called the "Head" of the rule and the atoms B1 ∧ ... ∧ Bn are called the
body of the rule. Variables that occur in the head must also occur in the body.
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The atoms within a SWRL rule can be of the form C(x), P (x, y), sameAs(x, y) or
differentFrom(x, y), where C is an OWL class, P is an OWL property, and x, y are
either variables, OWL individuals or OWL data values. The H atom will be true if all
atoms B1 ∧ ... ∧Bn are true.
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORKS
In this chapter, we investigate the existing access control, privilege delegation, provision-
ing and obligations approaches. In section 3.1, we briefly present the traditional access
control models because most modern Context-Based Access Control are basing their for-
mal representation on them. Section 3.3 presents related works on Context-Based Access
Control and section 3.4 is dedicated for privilege delegation approaches in access control,
while section 3.5 introduces obligation policies and obligation mechanisms.
Access policy is defined by Bellavista et al. [7] as the choices that are used for ruling
system behavior, in terms of the actions subjects can/must operate upon resources. These
choices can be either a permission, which is a prescription that a particular behavior is
allowed to occur, a prohibition, a prescription that a particular behavior must not occur, or
an obligation, which is a prescription that a particular behavior is required [14].
3.1 TRADITIONAL ACCESS CONTROL
Several access control models have been proposed in the last four decades. Among the
widely-adopted models in information security field, the Discretionary [48] and the Manda-
tory [22] Access Control models (DAC and MAC, respectively), and Role Based Access
Control model (RBAC) [60] were the dominant ones.
3.1.1 DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL
Discretionary access control (DAC) was proposed in early 1970s. The DAC model is based
on an access matrix, which was proposed by Lampson [48] and then it was formalized by
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Harrison et al. [33]. It declares for each combination of a subject and an object the set of
allowed actions. The access rights can be stored in a matrix with the columns representing
objects, rows representing subjects, and the entries being the granted privileges. That is,
when a system receives an access request, the authorization mechanism checks the subject’s
identity and the granted permissions on the requested object.
However, DAC has some limitations. DAC policies are susceptible to a Trojan Horse
in which the content of files is maliciously copied from one file to another because there
is no control on copies of objects. Also, correctness of DAC policies is complicated due
to unrestricted ownership of objects’ permissions. Absence of constraints on the propaga-
tion of rights and copying information expose underlying policies to serious safety issues.
Moreover, with the large number of subjects and objects makes it very complicated to adopt
DAC for managing access rights.
3.1.2 MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [22] has its roots in the military and intelligence com-
munities, where restrict access rules need to be active in place. MAC bases its access
control on hierarchical classification levels. MAC-based systems can provide protection of
either the confidentiality or integrity of data. We should emphasize; however, MAC cannot
provide both confidentiality and integrity at the same time (simultaneously). The subject
used by MAC-based system has a different meaning than that considered in DAC-based
systems. In DAC-based systems, subjects correspond to users or groups. In MAC-based
systems, subjects can refer to the processes (i.e., programs in execution) operating on behalf
of users. This distinction allows the MAC-based systems to control the indirect accesses
caused by the execution of processes, which is the main security problem of DAC-based
solutions.
In MAC, a subject s is allowed to access a resource r (or object o) only if its access
class is greater or equal to the access class of the resource. For example, a subject s with
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access class Secret S is able to read and write Secret (S), Confidential (C), and Unclassified
(U) resources, but not Top Secret (TP) resources.
3.1.3 ROLE BASED ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) was first proposed by Ferraiolo et al. [25]. The orig-
inal RBAC model was known as RBAC92 and this model has been extended by Sandhu
et al. [61] in 1994. In RBAC, roles are assigned to users (to subjects) and each role is
associated with a set of permissions. The subjects activate the assigned roles to get the
permissions associated with these roles. The RBAC framework introduced by Sandhu et
al. [61] consists of a set of four RBAC models. The base model is called RBAC0 (also
known as RBAC core or RBAC flat). The RBAC1 includes the RBAC0, but it adds the
support of Roles Hierarchy. In RBAC2, constraints are added to the RBAC0. RBAC3
includes RBAC0, RBAC1 and RBAC2 via transitivity. The user-role and permission-role
assignment can be many-to-many.
In the RBAC0 model, user-to-roles mapping is called user assignment (UA) and per-
missions to roles mapping is called permissions assignment(PA). This model is formally
defined below:
• U,R, P, and S for users, roles, permissions and sessions, respectively,
• PA⊆ P× R, a many-to-many permission to role assignment relation,
• UA⊆ U× R, a many-to-many user to role assignment relation,
• user: S→ U, a function mapping each session sei to the single user user(sei), and
• roles: S→ 2R, a function mapping each session sei to a set of roles roles(sei) ⊆
{r|(user(sei), r) ∈ UA} and session sei has the permissions Ur∈roles(sei){p|(p, r) ∈
PA}.
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In RBAC1, role hierarchies is introduced. RBAC1 is based on the concept of role hier-
archies as a means to reflect organizational hierarchies. The senior role has more privilege
than a junior role and inherits all the permissions of its juniors in the hierarchy. The formal
presentation of hierarchical RBAC is presented as follows:
• U,R, P, S, PA,UA, and user are unchanged from the basic RBAC model,
• RH→ R× R is a partial order on R called the role hierarchy relation, also written as
≥, and
• roles: S→ 2R is from the RBAC0 model to requires that roles(sei)⊆{r|(user(sei), r
) ∈ UA} and session sei has the permissions Ur∈roles(sei){p|(p, r) ∈ PA}.
RBAC2 model is used to model the natural constraints in organizational roles. For
example, in an organization a purchase manager who makes purchase decisions is different
from a finance manager who makes the payment. Another disjoint role is a finance auditor
who audits the accounts. No single individual should be able to activate two or more of
these roles, which is an essential constraint on these roles. These roles are also referred
to as mutually exclusive roles. Another type of role in this model is the prerequisite role
where a user has to be a member of a prerequisite role before he can become a member
of the desired role. For example, in health systems, before a user can be mapped to a
’Consultant’ or ’Surgeon’ role in a hospital (s)he works in, (s)he should be a member of
the role ’Doctor’ in that hospital.
The main difficulty with RBAC systems is that role management is a huge task in a large
system. Even if de-centralized administration is used, role management is an administrator
function and hence relies on an administrator to manage and administer roles. Another
problem with RBAC systems is that for each new composition of users, a new role must
be defined. In a large system with large combinations of roles, the RBAC model results in
a problem called ’role explosion’ where the number of roles increases exponentially and
ultimately becomes unmanageable.
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Our framework provides a solution that makes Context-Based Access Control (CBAC)
more flexible than RBAC systems and addresses the mobility issue through using semantic
information.
3.2 ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
In Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [75], the access privileges (permissions) are
associated with attributes and not roles. Thus, subject’s attributes are very important in
ABAC-based models because they specify the properties of the active entity that tries to
access the protected resources.
The attributes are determined according to the domain in which ABAC is applied. Usu-
ally, some of the attributes are related to the information fed by the user or system security
officer, but most of these are elements in the system and do not need to be manually entered
by administration (e.g., many of the attributes about an object come from its meta-data).
Attributes can be grouped into the following four categories:
• Subject attributes: attributes that describe the user attempting the access e.g. age,
clearance, department, role, job title.
• Action attributes: attributes that describe the action being attempted such as read,
delete, write, append.
• Resource (or object) attributes: attributes that describe the object being accessed e.g.
the object type (medical record, bank account...), the department, the classification
or sensitivity, the location.
• Contextual (environment) attributes: attributes that deal with time, physical location
or dynamic aspects of the access control scenario such as session start date/time,
current session length, host name, number of access requests made, and so forth.
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In ABAC, access policies can be created using policy languages, limiting access to cer-
tain resources or objects, based on the result of a Boolean statement comparing attributes,
for example "subject.age≤ 20 OR resource.owner == user.id" or "TIME > 8 : 00AM
AND TIME < 5 : 00PM". This allows for flexible enforcement of real world policies,
while only requiring knowledge of some subset of attributes about a given subject (user)
[68].
3.3 CONTEXT-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
Existing approaches for Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) can be divided into three
categories depending on how the context is used. In the first category, the context is asso-
ciated with roles in RBAC. The second category uses the context as a set of attributes for
ABAC. The third category does not depend any preexisting access control model, rather, it
concentrates on the context itself and its contextual components.
3.3.1 RBAC-BASED CBAC
In the first category, Covington et al. [16, 17] present a model which they call Generalized
Role-Based Access Control (GRBAC). GRBAC builds upon traditional Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) with two new concepts: object roles and environment roles. They use an
elegant means for capturing and using a user’s context in access control. In particular,
similar to subject roles of RBAC, the environment roles, can be used to capture security-
relevant aspects of the environment in which an application executes.
Kulkarni et. al. [47] develop a Context-Aware RBAC, which allows roles to be granted
based on context but permitting a second layer of authorization architecture. This second
layer’s responsibility is to grant and revoke roles when the context changes. This way,
dynamic roles can be reflected onto the context. Sladic´ et. al. [70] have proposed a different
solution via engaging context into ontology-based RBAC model. Their model grants roles
to users after the authentication operation is completed based on context. Users can obtain
25
new roles that reflect their contexts. The authors also define a context dependent constraint
on assignment relations and on a role activation. Thus, an assignment relation with such
constraint will be established only if the context dependent constraint is fulfilled. The same
thing is applied to a role activation.
However, solutions presented in [47] and [70] have a problem that they cannot be inte-
grated with traditional RBAC. Once the system starts assigning roles based on context, all
authorization rules are affected.
Kodali et al. [45] propose a DAML (DARPA Agent Markup Language, an ancestor of
OWL) ontology that combines DAC, MAC and RBAC models in one framework. Most
importantly, their model can be used to associate access control policies with roles. Wu et
al. [76] provide a basic modeling for RBAC concepts and constraints using OWL. User,
Role, Permission and Session entities are represented as classes. While, the following
properties are used to represent relationships:
• hasRole (assigns a user to a role),
• hasPermission (associates a role with a permission),
• belongTo (maps a session to a single user), and
• hasActiveRole (maps a set of roles to a session).
Two additional properties are used to model separation of duty and prerequisite constraints:
• conflictRole (indicates that there is a conflict between two roles), and
• prerequesiteRole (specifies that one role is dependent on another).
Finin et al. [26] build on the work proposed by Wu et al. [76] examine the advantages
and disadvantages of representing roles as classes and roles as instances. When roles are
represented as instances, the modeling is simple and more concise. Whereas, when roles
are represented as classes, it is possible to determine subsumption relationships according
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to a user’s active role and the role hierarchy, using standard description logic subsumption.
In order to have the ability to enforce role deactivation, it should be possible to temporarily
remove a user from a role.
Keyes et al. [43] developed a semantic-based authorization policy framework for defin-
ing and enforcing two sets of policies that use contexts: the context-aware user-role and
role-permission assignment policies. The first set of policies specifies that users can play
a particular role when a set of conditions are satisfied. The second set of policies speci-
fies that users having roles are allowed to carry out an operation on the resources when a
set of conditions are satisfied. When a user wants to access resources, policy enforcement
determines if an access request is granted or denied.
3.3.2 ABAC-BASED CBAC
This category uses the context as a set of attributes for ABAC. Dersingh et al. [23] have
proposed a policy system that separates context’s management from access control man-
agement, it is relatively similar to our approach in this concern. The policy system they
proposed extends the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) by adding
the capability of using context vocabularies in the policy and designating subjects and re-
sources via semantic knowledge. Seitz et al. [66] described a framework for authorization
and access control on IoT, in the context of interconnected systems consisting of resource-
constrained devices not directly operated by humans. Their approach, however, does not
support context nor semantic-web technologies and works as an add-on for XACML which
makes it difficult to adopt for IoT because evaluating XACML policies is too heavyweight
for constrained devices and therefore the authors of [66] made the authorization decision
process external to XACML policies. Hilia et al. [35] present a semantic-based authoriza-
tion approach for controlling access in collaborative cloud environments. Their approach
is also based on the XACML architecture and makes access decision according to con-
textual situations. Authorization context is evaluated by XACML Engine. The contextual
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information is retrieved from several sources, i.e. by using attribute finders to dynami-
cally search, and perform dynamic queries for the environmental values of these attributes.
However, approaches in [23, 35, 66] highlight extending the well-known ABAC XACML
framework with semantic-based context.
Covington and Sastry [18] presented a contextual attribute-based access control (ABAC)
model which was realized in mobile applications. They used contexts as add-ons for the
ABAC.
Das et al. [21] They presented a method for context-sensitive access control for IoT
that uses reasoning over contextual ABAC. One of the main advantages of ABAC is that
requesters do not have to be known a priori by targets, providing a higher level of flexibility
for open environments, compared to RBAC models. Nevertheless, in ABAC everyone must
agree on a set of attributes and their meaning when using ABAC, which is not easy to
accomplish, particularly in dynamic environments.
However, in ABAC everyone must agree on a set of attributes and their meaning when
using ABAC, which is hard to achieve, especially in distributed environment.
3.3.3 INDEPENDENT CBAC
Corradi et al. [15] have presented the first well-developed approach that uses ontologies
to support context-based access control. The authors employed the context to be the main
principle for security policy specification and enforcement. They adopted an RDF-based
semantics for context representation to handle heterogeneity of data representation. How-
ever, the authors do not extend the RDF-based semantics to cope with large vocabulary of
the current environments and the developing status of sophisticated semantic-based tools.
This is a limitation because the approach they proposed cannot infer the semantic relation-
ships of entities represented by OWL, for example. Toninelli et al. [42] introduce the Pro-
teus framework. The framework uses the contexts represented as description logic (OWL
ontologies) and logical programming rules to enable the dynamic adaptation of policies by
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linking the requests to the data and the context. The proposed framework aimed to work
in pervasive and ubiquitous environments. However, our approach differs from Proteus
in the underlying formalism and the semantics of requests. Based on Proteus framework,
Bellavista and Montanari [8] proposed an implementation for IoT adaptive context-based
access authorizations. However, using only OWL ontologies encounters some difficulties
with regard to the definition of policies, especially those policies that require the definition
of variables. For example, the use case of a "same location policy", that grants access to
files only when location(user) = location(file) is a good example that illustrates the need
for variables.
Shen and Cheng [69] use OWL ontologies to specify both positive and negative au-
thorizations and obligations. The context is used to provide a level of indirection between
subjects and permissions. An authorization permits/prohibits an action, based on sets of
contexts supplied by the user. Actions are used to represent operations that a specific sub-
ject wants to perform. Permission assignments are used to associate contexts with actions.
Rules are used to insert new authorizations, based on contextual information, into a knowl-
edge base.
Also, Schuster et al. [65] present a design and implementation for IoT access control.
They introduce "environmental situation oracles" (ESOs) as first-class objects in the IoT
ecosystem. The method they describe depends on a situation, that can only be tracked using
multiple devices. They use typical API-level operations that can possibly subdivided by
the input-parameter values if different values require different access right. However, their
approach does not use semantic technologies and can not provide inference over access
control policies.
Definition 3.1. (Least Privilege Principle [64]). The least privilege principle states that a
subject should be given only those privileges that it needs in order to complete its task.
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3.4 PRIVILEGE DELEGATION IN ACCESS CONTROL
The fundamental idea behind delegation is that some active entity in a system, the delegator,
delegates privileges to another active entity, the delegatee, to carry out some functions on
behalf of the former. Delegation in computer systems can be human to human, human
to machine, machine to machine, and perhaps even machine to human. Most delegation
models in the literature address human to machine and machine-to-machine delegation [6].
Delegation of the privileges is an important mechanism to support dynamic and adaptive
access control in real world applications. It is usually used for distributing responsibilities
of task management among entities.
Delegation comes in two forms [19], GRANT and TRANSFER. In GRANT delega-
tion, a successful delegation operation allows delegated permissions to be available to both
the delegator and delegatee. In TRANSFER delegation, the delegated permissions are no
longer available to the delegator.
There is a significant previous work on Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) [11,
15, 31, 41, 47, 69, 72, 73]. However, support to delegate CBAC privileges is limited.
For example, approaches described in [8, 11, 47, 72, 69] do not provide any delegation
services. Most of the existing delegation methods are based on traditional access control
models, such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) models [73, 78]. Methods such as
attribute-based delegation [54, 68] and capability-based delegation [31, 41] require that the
underlying access control policy is changed. Moreover, none of the methods address the
issue of context delegation when the access authorization is a context-dependent. Further-
more, only a few approaches have extensively studied TRANSFER delegation due to the
complexity of enforcing TRANSFER delegation mechanisms.
In Chapter 5, we present an approach that overcomes these limitations and introduces
a novel model for semantic-based context delegation.
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3.5 OBLIGATIONS IN ACCESS CONTROL
Obligation policies define the actions that must be performed by subjects on resources when
certain triggering events occur in a response to changing circumstances. The triggering
events can be simple, such as an internal timer event, or an external event notified by
monitoring service components e.g. a temperature exceeding a threshold or a component
failing [20].
Obligation in access control has been extensively studied by researchers. For exam-
ple, Hilty et al. [36] propose a formal framework for enforcing obligation policies through
using Distributed Temporal Logic (DTL) to classify data protection requirements. Bettini
et al. [10] propose an approach for specifying and evaluating provisions and obligations
in Access Control (AC). Their method is based on the expression of Datalog Rules and
reasoning for evaluating authorization and obligation decisions. They use the term "provi-
sion" to refer to the conditions that must be met before data is released after a request is
received. We should note that provisions are encoded within our semantic-based authoriza-
tion model. Authors in [67] provide OWL-Polar, a framework for the semantic definition
and enforcement of permission, prohibition and obligation statements. Their definition of
an obligation involves activation conditions and contents. OWL-Polar uses SPARQL-DL
[55] queries for checking the fulfillment of consumer obligations using reasoning, where
activation conditions are translated into standard SPARQL queries [51]. Chen et al. [12]
define a model that engages obligations in the environment of risk-aware access control.
Obligations are combined with a specific measure of how much risk is incurred by allowing
or denying access to specific resources. Obligations are enforced effectively if and only if
the measured risk for enforcing them is lower than a specified threshold.
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CHAPTER 4
CONTEXT-BASED AUTHORIZATION FRAMEWORK
The goal of this chapter is to show how ontologies, combined with logic programming
rules, are used to support adaptive and flexible access control decisions. The main con-
tribution of this chapter is to provide a flexible and adaptive context-based authorization
model. Our framework uses contextual information to derive access decisions. We have
developed two OWL ontologies. The first one, CTX-Lite ontology, is used for representing
and reasoning over the contextual information. The second ontology, CBAC, is used to
represent and reason over the Knowledge Base (KB) to derive the access control decisions.
More specifically, CTX-Lite ontology is used to annotate the raw contextual data. The
annotation is then used by CTX-Lite to derive inferred high-level context from the raw ob-
servations. This high-level context is then used by the CBAC engine to derive a decision.
Hence, CTX-Lite ontology serves as a core ontology for context handling operations. The
approach described in this chapter is grounded in Semantic Web technologies, specifically
OWL ontologies, Pellet reasoner, Jena inference rules, and SPARQL (SPARQL Protocol
And RDF Query Language) queries.
The architectural view of the proposed system includes two components is shown in
Figure 4.1. The context manger and CBAC engine. The context manager receives requests
from the CBAC engine asking for a specific context. In its response to these requests,
the context manager gathers, annotates, processes, and reasons over the gathered data to
produce the context. Then it sends the resulted context to the CBAC engine. Based on the
received context and its own KB (represented as ontologies and rules), the CBAC engine
reasons over this KB to derive an access control decision.
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Figure 4.1: CBAC Architectural View of The Proposed System.
We use description logic (DL) and Logic programming (LP) technologies for modeling
contexts and Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) rules. In our approach, access autho-
rization decision is solely made based on the inferred context. We have separated context
operations from access authorization operations to:
• reduce processing time burden for Dynamic Distributed Networks (DDNs) devices,
and
• offer modularity through managing the complexity of the problem by breaking it
down to smaller manageable modules.
We validate the work presented in this chapter by a proof of concept implementation.
4.1 FORMAL REPRESENTATION OF THE CONTEXTS
Our model is formally specified using description logic DL. We have separated context
operations from access authorization operations to reduce processing time burden for net-
work devices. The complex context handling process is taken care by a dedicated server
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that hosts the context manager. This will release the CBAC engine, which is usually hosted
by an intermediate node that controls the network device or by a network device (this is
very rare since network devices, like IoT devices, have too limited resources to host such a
big application).
Our context model is built around the concept of contextual attribute, information which
models contextual attributes of the physical/logical environment such as location and tem-
perature, as presented in definition 4.3.
Definition 4.1. (Ontology). Let rdfi = ( C`1, ri, C`2 ) be an RDF triple, where C`1 and C`2
are concepts, and ri is a relationship from C`1 to C`2. An ontology Ont is represented by
({rdf1, ..., rdfm}, Cs), where Cs is the set of constraints imposed on rdfi and C`j definition.
Definition 4.2. (Instance relation). Let Ont be an ontology and I = {i1, ..., im} be a set
of instances, such that for every ij ∈ I, there is an ISA relation from ij to a concept C`1 in
Ont, and for every ik ∈ I, there is an ISA relation from ik to a concept C`2 in Ont, i.e., (ij ,
ISA, C`1) and (ik, ISA, C`2). The instance relation is any relation of the form (ij , rp, ik).
Definition 4.3. (Contextual Attribute). Let A = {an1, ..., ann} be a set of attribute names
and V = {av1, ..., avn} be a set of attribute values. A contextual attribute, denoted as ai, is
a pair (ani, avi), such that ani ∈ A and avi ∈ dom(ani), (i = 1, ..., n), where dom(ani) is
the domain of ani.
Specific context subclasses can be represented under Generic Concept Context. Each
sub-context class consists of attribute values and constants. In our model, the generic
context of the subject is given by the DL axiom 4.1. For example, A reference context
of OnDutyDoctor is represented as it is shown in DL axiom 4.2. Note that the con-
cept OnDutyDoctor includes all the characteristics specifications of the generic concept
SContext. We call this context a reference context. It holds the high-level context of an
entity which will be used later as a reference when we need to instantiate the active context
of that entity.
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SContext ≡ Context u (User u ∃hasID.IDentity
u ∃hasRole.Role u ∃hasGroup.Group)
u (Environment u ∃hasLocation.Location)u
(TElement u ∃hasT ime.T ime_Interval) u ∃
hasID.Identifier (4.1)
OnDutyDoctor ≡ Context u (User u ∃hasID.IDentity
u ∃hasRole.Role{Doctor} u ∃hasGroup.Group
{InShiftDoctors}) u (Environment{WorkingEnvrnt}
u ∃hasLocation.Location{Hospital}) u (TElement
{WorkingT ime} u ∃hasT ime{xsd : dateT ime
[≥ 2018− 04− 06T09 : 00 : 00,≤ 2018− 04− 06
T17 : 00 : 00]}) u ∃hasID.{0} (4.2)
The active context holds the entity context at a specific instant of time. For example,
when an entity requests an access to a resource. Active contexts are like their reference
contexts counterparts. However, they differ in that they do not have range values in their
definitions. Active context reflects a real snapshot of an entity’s context at a specific time
instant. For example, the following DL axiom describes a certain user context at 2018-04-
06T14:23:00, which represents 2:23 pm on April 6, 2018:
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OnDutyDoctor{Bob} ≡ Context u (User{Bob} u ∃
hasID.IDentity{Doctor777} u ∃hasRole.Role
{Doctor} u ∃hasGroup.Group{InShiftDoctors})u
(Environment{WorkingEnvrnt} u ∃hasLocation
.Location{HospitalA}) u (TElement{WorkingT ime}
u existshasT ime.T ime_Instance{xsd : dateT ime
[2018− 04− 06T14 : 23 : 00]}) u ∃hasID.{0} (4.3)
This concept states that Bob is OnDutyDoctor at time 2:23 pm on April 6, 2018, if he
is a user, has a role of Doctor, belongs to a group that is called InShiftDoctor, within a
WorkingEnvrnt, at location Hospital and during the WorkingT ime.
The context ontology is flexible. It can be extended or shrinked by adding or removing
subcontexts or by adding or removing contextual attributes to the subcontexts.
In Figure 4.1, which displays an architectural view of the system, the CBAC engine
receives a request from a user trying to access a resource from a specific network device.
The CBAC engine parses the request, dismantles it to its components, and if it requires
a context, it consults the context manager. We discuss more about request processing
in Section 4.2. The CBAC engine communicates with context manager using SPARQL
queries over HTTP protocol [57].
The reasoning process, for context manager and the CBAC engine, flows as depicted
in Figure. 4.2. The reasoning begins with ontological reasoning using tableau-based Pel-
let reasoner. This process forms the bulk of reasoning in our approach and is used for
checking ontology satisfiability and consistency, conceptual subsumption, and instance re-
alization. Logic programming reasoning is only used for modeling access control rules and
for situations that need the use of variables.
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Figure 4.2: The Flow of Reasoning.
4.1.1 THE LIGHTWEIGHT CONTEXT ONTOLOGY CTX-LITE
Schilit et al. [62] categorized contextual information into three categories depending on the
place (where) the activity is taking place at, (what) resources nearby, and (who) the entity
is with. We add to this category the concept of time as (when) the activity is taking place.
We believe that these four categories are the most fundamental information to capture the
context of communicating entities (agents).
We adopted the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) "good ontologies" criteria [3] in
designing our model ontologies.
The context ontology, CTX-Lite, defines eight basic concepts as top-level concepts;
these concepts are Agent, Device, Service, Network, Location, Time, Activity and Context.
The ontology has the concept Context as the top concept. The Context concept represents
the higher contextual concept and it has two subcontexts for representing atomic context
and composite context, and these are Atomicctx and Compositectx, respectively. The Com-
positectx has seven subconcepts that represent our four fundamental high-level contexts as
well as other three concepts for handling unnamed contexts, personal contexts, and spa-
tiotemporal contexts. These sub concepts are: Behavioral, Temporal, Spatial, Spatiotem-
poral, Environmental, Personal, and Unnamed concept; Figure 4.3 shows the main concept
hierarchy. The CTX-Lite ontology is only 146 RDF triples, and this is to make it as generic
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Figure 4.3: CTX-Lite Ontology Concept Hierarchy.
as possible.
Example 4.4. Most modern cars are equipped with a variety of sensing devices. For ex-
ample, most cars have sensor units such as Air Bag Sensors, Blind spot Sensors, Back up
Sensors, Low Air Sensors, . . . etc. Also, some cars are already equipped with Blue-tooth
and Wi-Fi devices. For example, starting in mid-2014 and working through its OnStar divi-
sion, GM introduced built-in 4G LTE Wi-Fi provided by AT&T and launched the service in
certain 2015 model-year vehicles which permit up to 7 devices to be connected within a car
[1]. In this ongoing progress, we expect that by 2021 all cars will be equipped with Wi-Fi
and Blue-tooth devices and become connected with the external world. From security and
privacy point of view, we are concern about protecting a vehicle and its user information
from a malicious use or unauthorized access. Now consider the following scenarios:
Alice has a car equipped with a Wi-Fi connection and a built-in GPS device. By default,
all operational units in the car, according to the manufacturer setting, are accessible by
the car driver (or owner of the car) and hence in normal daily commuting, the network
connection is provided for Alice by default, but it is forbidden for other car riders. When
there is an idle system functionality, these idle systems should be accessible to the car
passengers. For example, when on a highway and the car speed is above 70 kmph and the
GPS device readings state that the destination is to be reached in no less than 30 minutes.
Also, there is, other than Alice, another rider in the car with body weight of (73 Kilogram),
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then access control should permit the other car riders to access to the Wi-Fi connection so
that they can use their devices by connecting them to the car Wi-Fi system.
Example 4.4 explains two desired properties of context, the first one is the normal be-
havior in normal driving conditions when access to the car Wi-Fi connection is permitted
only for the car driver. The other is the adaptive behavior which depends on several condi-
tions. For example, to represent the context of the passenger presence (sitting) on the car
seat OccupiedPassengerSeat, theDL axiom equivalent to it is shown below:
OccupiedPassengerSeat ≡ CarSeat u (∃hasDevice.(SensingDevice.
∃madeObservation.(Observation.(∃observedProperty.Propertyu
(∃featureofinterest.FeatureOfInterest) u (∃observationResult.
(SensorOutput u (∃hasvalue.(ObservationV alue u ∃
hasDataV alue.(xsd : float{≥ 30,≤ 110}.∃
hasUnit.xsd : string{′Kg′}))))))))) (4.4)
Figure 4.4 illustrates calculating of contextual relations that contribute in context build-
ing. The contractual relations in this example are: Rc = {hasDevice, madeObservation,
observedProperty, featureofinterest,
observationResult, hasvalue, hasDataV alue, hasUnit}. The observations are:
O = {o1 = (bodyweight, 73), o2(Unit, ”Kilogram”)
While The context is given by:
Ck = (O∪Rc∪F ). The dotted curve represents the context OcuppiedPassengerSeat.
The numbers between curved braces represent the stages of computing the context axiom
until reaching the observations.
This says that the context of OcuppiedPassengerSeat that is not the driver seat, is
represented by an entity that belongs to a CarSeat concept and has a device attached to it.
This device is a sensing device which makes an observation. The observation is related to
a property to be observed, which in its turn, is associated with a feature of interest that is
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Figure 4.4: Contextual relations for scenario1.
to be observed or estimated. The feature of interest is related to an observation result. This
result must have a value, which in its turn has a unit to measure.
In logic programming (LP which is part of FOL paradigm, where all the variables are
instantiated over the knowledge base (KB)), this context can be written as:
OccupiedPassengerSeat ⇐= CarSeat(x) ∧ Entity(x) ∧ hasDevice(x, d)∧
SensingDevice(d) ∧madeObservation(d, o) ∧Observation(o)
∧ observedProperty(o, p) ∧ featureofinterest(p, f)∧
observationResult(f, so) ∧ hasvalue(so, v) ∧ hasDataV alue(v, 73)
∧ hasUnit(v,′Kg′) (4.5)
Now let’s analyze our OcuppiedPassengerSeat example and see how to annotate, instan-
tiate, and infer this context. The ssn1 ontology presents the class ssn:SensingDevice as
1http://purl.oclc.org/NET/ssnx/ssn#
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a subclass of ssn:Sensor as well as of ssn:Device. The OccupancySensor is a very spe-
cific type of sensing devices. We first create a small hierarchy of sensing devices’ types.
It specifies that OccupancySensor is a sensing device and that CNDtekD100 is an in-
stance of this sensing device. Now suppose we have a car Smart-BuickCar-2016. The
car is provided with BuickPassengerSeat as passenger seats. This BuickPassengerSeat
is equipped with a sensing device, CNDtekD100, for sensing and estimating the weight
(the property to be observed), and the FeatureOfInterest (bodyweight). This requires that
the o1 (observation), ov1 (observation value), so1 (sensor output), dataValue and the unit
of measure to be annotated also. Figure (3) illustrates an excerpt of the annotation of the
context ontology with other well-known ontologies. The ssn, qu2 , iot-lite3 , and units4
ontologies are imported to help in carving for on-line semantics that support the context
ontology, CTX-Lite, we build.
4.1.2 SPATIOTEMPORAL CONTEXTS REPRESENTATION
Spatial and temporal contexts represent the most permanent components of any contextual
information as they provide the gluing joints of any context. Events in the world occur at
specific locations and times and usually have finite durations. In our model, we capture the
user’s (agent) location as geo-spatial coordinates represented as longitude and latitude (any
other method also works like GPS coordinates). The important feature of the geo-spatial
coordinates is that they can flexibly be mapped into other location representations. For
example, geo-spatial coordinates of latitude 33.991981 and longitude -81.031345 points to
the address 555 Assembly street, Columbia, SC, USA (address), which is also the address
of Storey Innovation Center (building).
2http://purl.org/NET/ssnx/qu/qu#
3http://purl.oclc.org/NET/UNIS/fiware/iot-lite
4http://sweet.jpl.nasa.gov/ontology/units.owl#
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Figure 4.5: Time Ontology.
In our model, time is captured using the Time ontology5. Time concepts, like space
concepts, can be mapped into conceptual concepts, like during, before, after, . . . etc., or to
concrete concepts like 12:56:33 EST. The core classes and properties of the Time ontology
are shown in Figure 4.6, as they have been published by W3C. Using Allen’s 13 pair-
wise disjoint temporal relations [38] and Time ontology, an interval-based and point-based
representation of time is possible and straightforward. Point-based representation assumes
linear ordering of time points with three possible relations, namely <, >, =, which referred
to as before, after, and equals, respectively. Based on these ordering relations, intervals can
also be defined as ordered pairs of points s and e, with s < e, which often referred to as
start and end of an interval.
5https://raw.githubusercontent.com/w3c/sdw/gh-pages/time/rdf/time.ttl
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Figure 4.6: Allen’s Temporal Relations [38].
Figure 4.7: CBAC Ontology Core Concepts.
4.2 MODELING CONTEXT-BASED ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
We adopt the context as the core element around which all access authorization operations
are based. In our approach, the access authorization depends on the visibility of certain
contexts that are to be fed to the access control engine. The access control engine, depend-
ing on the provided context information, may deny or permit such an access authorization
request. Access control policy requirements are represented using the ontology shown in
Figure 4.7 and Jena rules. The context-based access control model, or CBAC model, con-
sists of a set of rules and each rule is given by the following definition:
Definition 4.5. (Access Control Policy (ACP) Rules). Let Rule, Request, RequestType,
RequestSubject, SubjectContext, RequestObject, ObjectContext, RequestDecision,
DecisionEffect, GeneralContext be concepts defined in CBAC ontology. Then, the
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ACP rule is given as:
rule = 〈r, rt, rs, sc, ro, oc, rd, de, gc∗〉 (4.6)
where rule ∈ Rule, r ∈ Request, rt ∈ RequestType, rs ∈ RequestSubject, sc ∈
SubjectContext, ro ∈ RequestObject, oc ∈ ObjectContext (Resource (or Object)
context), or context of the agent working on behalf of the resource, or the resource’s owner
context, oc ∈ ObjectContext, rd ∈ RequestDecision, de ∈DecisionEffect, and gc∗ ∈
GeneralContext.
Definition 4.6. (Access Request). Access request is given as a triple 〈s, rs, ac〉, where
s ∈ Subject, rs ∈ Resource, ac ∈ Action.
Each ACP rule is triggered by an access request and is evaluated to a decision at run-
time. The decision has an effect which, in our model, is either a "Deny" or a "Permit". The
star on the gc is to indicate that this field is optional while the other fields are mandatory.
We represent the CBAC policy as a set of conjunctive rules as follows:
CBAC Ploicy = rule1 ∧ rule2 ∧ rule3 ∧ rule4 ∧ rule5 . . .
Now let’s represent our access control model using DL (and hence in OWL-DL). Given
the above clarification of how to represent rules, the rule axiom becomes straightforward
and is given as:
Rule ≡Request u ∃hasType.RequestType u ∃hasSubject.Subject
(∃hasContext.Context) u ∃hasObject.Object(∃hasContext.Context)
u hasDecision.(Decision.∃hasEffect{”Deny”, ”Permit”}) (4.7)
In OWL2, this is written as:
Rule ≡hasRequest some (Request and (hasType some RequestType)) and
(hasSubject some (Subject and (hasContext some Context))) and
(hasObject some (Object and (hasContext some Context))) (hasDecision
some (Decision and (hasEffect some Effect))) (4.8)
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When all the access control rules are specified as we have done above, run-time evaluation
of the access authorization is accomplished when a request received by CBAC engine.
Algorithm 1 Simple Access Authorization.
Input: CBAC, CBAC ontology and RQ is an Access Request. RS is Jena rule-set
Output: Access decision, either "Deny" or "Permit".
1: RT←parse(RQ) . RT = 〈s, r, ac〉
2: if RT = access then
3: sc←getContext(s);
4: rc←getContext(r);
5: p←evaluate(s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS);
6: if p = ”Permit” AND noConflict(p, s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS) then
7: return(”Permit”);
8: exit();
9: end if
10: else
11: return(”Deny”);
12: exit();
13: end if
Algorithm 1 evaluates a simple kind of access authorization, an access authorization
that does not involve the case when delegation or/and obligation is present within access
control policy setting. For example, an access request denoted as ar = 〈s, r, ”read”〉,
represents the case when subject s is requesting a ”read” access to a resource r. The CBAC
engine requests the contexts of s and r and evaluates the permission p for the request ar.
Assume the contexts of s and r are sc and rc, respectively. If using the contexts sc and rc,
the CBAC engine can derive a permission, i.e., p is ”Permit”, and there is no conflict, it
grants the access permission for the request. Otherwise, it denies the request.
We should also note that our authorization framework does not involve authentication.
If authentication is to be engaged in our framework, there are two methods to do that. Either
using plug-in authentication service, in this case it will be merged with our framework, or
we can use an authentication service as a separate module and call it from our framework.
This method provides modularity and reduces complexity of the system.
The functions getContext(), evaluate(s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS) and noConflict(p, s,
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Table 4.1: Access authorization rules for the running example.
No. Rule
Rule-1: An owner of a device can ac-
cess the device’s resources ir-
respective of her/his context.
Rule-2: A paramedic personnel who
is on duty at the time of
emergency can access patient
device’s resources in case
that patient suffers from that
emergency case.
sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS) will be explained in detail in chapter 5 when we introduce context
delegation model.
From example 1.1 in Chapter 1, we build two access control authorization rules that are
shown in Table 4.1.
The first rule does not encompass any context and hence there is no need for complex
rule.
For the second rule of the policy we need two contexts, one associated with the subject
(Joe in our case) and the second is associated with the resource’s owner (not the object).
The InEmergency context for Martha’s health condition using our approach is given as:
InEmergency ≡ Context u (User u ∃owns(Device u ∃hasDevice.
(SensingDevice u ∃madeObservation.(Observation.(∃observedProperty.
(Property u (∃featureofinterest.(FeatureOfInterest u ∃observationResult.
(SensorOutput u ∃hasvalue.(ObservationV alue u ∃hasDataV alue.
{xsd : float[≥ 180.0,≤ 55.0]} u ∃hasUnit.Unit u ∃hasT ime.T ime
u ∃hasLocation.Location u ∃mappedTo.P lace))))))))) (4.9)
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InEmergency ≡ Context u (User{Martha} u ∃owns(Device{MIS2DH} u ∃
hasDevice.(SensingDevice{HBSD100} u ∃madeObservation.(Observation{o1}
u ∃observedProperty.(Property{pulse− rate} u (∃featureofinterest.(
FeatureOfInterest{heart− beat− rate} u ∃observationResult.(SensorOutput
{so1} u ∃hasvalue.(ObservationV alue{ov1} u ∃hasDataV alue.{xsd : float[53]}
u ∃hasUnit.Unit{bpm} u ∃hasT ime.T ime{2 : 43} u ∃hasLocation.Location{`1}
u ∃mappedTo.P lace{gym− room}))))))))) (4.10)
The DL axioms above indicate that a user is InEmergency context if she owns a device
(MIS2DH) and this device has a sensing device (HBSD100) which has an observation (o1).
This observation is associated with a property (pulse rate in Martha case, it is a general
property to be observed) and this property has a feature of interest (heart beat rate, a
special feature of the observed property). The observation result (so1) is an output made
by the sensing device and it has an observation value (ov1), which in turn, has a data value
that represents the raw data measured by the sensing device and it is of float type (53). The
raw data has a unit (bpm, beats per minute) and a measurement sampling time (2:43 pm).
The location of the observation is (`1) that is mapped to a place (gym room).
If the ABox instances shown in Equation (7) are found in the KB during the inference
process, then we have:
TBox |= InEmergency(Martha) (4.11)
and
ABox |= InEmergency(Martha) (4.12)
then
KB |= InEmergency(Martha) (4.13)
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Figure 4.8: Martha’s InEmergency context inference.
The same is followed for Joe’s OnDuty context. Figure 4.8 shows Martha’s InEmergency
context inference. Associating the InEmergency context for Martha with OnDuty context
for Joe will lead to a "Permit" effect for Joe’s request to access Martha’s health records
using the rule 4.14. This rule states that if a request r of type access is issued to the CBAC
policy engine by a subject s that has a context OnDuty on a resource rs such that the
owner of the resource has a context InEmergency and request has a decision d, then insert
a Permit effect for d into the KB. In this rule, it is important to note that we do not need
to specify any identity or role for the subject requesting the access to resource to decide if
(s)he can access the resource or not. Also, we do not need the identity of the resource (or
the owner of the resource). The whole access authorization decision making is based on the
context of the request r (the contexts of the subject and resource altogether). Furthermore,
if the CBAC policy engine needs to know the identities of the subject and the resource, it
simply queries its KB store to know that. For example, if the CBAC policy engine needs to
know who is with context OnDuty and what resources rs can (s)he accesses; it can simply
issue the SPARQL (SPARQL Protocol And RDF Query Language [46]) query shown in
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4.15 to its KB store.
[rule2 :
(?r rdf : type cbac : Request)
(?r ctx : hasType app : access)
(?r cbac : hasSubject ?s)
(?s rdf : type app : OnDuty)
(?r cbac : hasResource ?rs)
(?rs ctx : hasOwnwer ?w)
(?w rdf : type app : InEmergency)
(?r cbac : hasDecision ?d)
− > (?d cbac : hasEffect cbac : Permit)]
(4.14)
SPARQL precedes a string by ? symbol to denote a variable, so the ?r, ?s, ?s − Id, ?rs,
?d, and ?ef are variables representing the request, the subject, subject ID, the resource, the
decision, and the impact, respectively. The result of the SPARQL query is given below:
?r ?s ?s-Id ?rs ?d ?ef
r1 s1 MSS56006 MarthaRecords d1 Permit
Our model uses "denial takes precedence" as a conflict resolution strategy. That is,
if "Deny" and "Permit" decisions are derived for an access request, then the request is
denied. An access permission to a resource is granted only when the subject’s context, the
resource’s context (or the resource owner’s context as it is the case in our running example),
and/or any other context that is specified by the access control policy and match a particular
"Permit" rule.
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Prefix xsd : < http : //www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema# >
Prefix rdfs : < http : //www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf − schema# >
Prefix ctx :< http : //www.semanticweb.org/Last− Context/ctx# >
Prefix ssn : < http : //purl.oclc.org/NET/ssnx/ssn# >
Prefix cbac : < http : //www.semanticweb.org/Last− Context/cbac# >
Prefix rdf : < http : //www.w3.org/1999/02/22− rdf − syntax− ns# >
Prefix terms : < http : //purl.org/dc/terms/ >
Prefix wgs84_pos : < http : //www.w3.org/2003/01/geo/wgs84_pos# >
Prefix dc : < http : //purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/ >
Select Distinct ?r, ?s, ?s− Id, ?rs, ?d ?ef
Where {
?r rdf : type cbac : Request.
?r cbac : hasSubject ?s.
?r cbac : hasResource ?rs.
?s ctx : hasID ?s− Id.
?r cbac : hasDecision ?d.
?d cbac : hasEffect ?ef.
}
(4.15)
Two decoupling approaches are applied in our approach. The first one is by virtue of
using OWL ontologies and as with all ontology-based access authorization methods, the
decoupling of conceptual layer from data layer occurs automatically [13]. The data layer
is kept hidden from user access request. All access requests are directed to the conceptual
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layer first and once the access request is authorized, access to specific data instances is
granted.
The second decoupling, Figure 4.9, is architectural and is a result of separating context
management from access control management we adopted in our approach and it has a
number of advantages:
• It permits to reuse the context and its management in other applications and not
limiting their use for access policies applications only.
• It allows distributing the processing overhead of both access control management
and context management as it is required by the application domain.
• It permits the access control engine to adopt multiple access control paradigms at
the same time. For example, when used in domains that need adaptable behavior like
IoT or can be tailored to work on domains that regard RBAC as the method of choice.
Figure 4.9: Ontology-Based Data Hiding Due to Decoupling.
4.3 IMPLEMENTATION AND DATA SETS
All experiments were conducted using two laptops, PC1 is a Windows 8.1, 1.9 GHz CPU,
4 GB RAM and 500 GB HDD, while PC2 is Windows 10 3.8 GHz CPU, 32 GB RAM, and
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2 TB HDD. Ten sets of data have been generated using on-line data generator [2] and been
processed to remove duplicates. Then we used Cellfie plug-in for Protègè [53] to assert
these instances to the model ontologies. The sets are 10000, 20000, 30000, 40000, 50000,
60000, 70000, 82000, 90000, and 100000 triples in their size.
We have conducted tests on the CBAC engine via submitting SPARQL queries to pop-
ulated samples of the CTX-Lite and CBAC ontologies in our application program. The
engine successfully returned only the authorized data specified by the sample access con-
trol rules. The reasoning process is accomplished using DL reasoner Pellet while LP is ac-
complished using forward chaining Jena inference engine and user-defined rules. The DL
reasoning has been used for checking ontology satisfiability and consistency, conceptual
subsumption, and instance realization. The bulk of reasoning process for access authoriza-
tion operation is done by DL, while LP is used only for simple situations like in case of
need to variables and to reason over access control rules.
The reasoning process has been repeated ten times for every one of the mentioned data
sets on each one of the two PCs. Then we take the average time computed for these ten
repetitions for reaching concrete values for the reasoning process execution time. The
same thing is repeated in calculating SPARQL query response time but for bigger data sets
because these are the results of inference upon the original data set models. Figures 4.10,
4.11, and 4.12 represent the results of DL reasoning time, DL+LP reasoning time, and
SPARQL query response time, respectively.
The results shown in Figures 4.10 and 4.11 illustrate that the scalability of reasoning
time is still linear (or in worst-case can be polynomial) in practical application of DL
reasoning and LP reasoning. This is much better than the worst-case complexity of DL
reasoning, which is NExpTime as we will see in next section. The results also indicates
that using light-weight OWL ontologies and safe-rules on top of the ontological model can
drastically enhance the performance of DL-based systems in real world applications.
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Figure 4.10: DL Reasoning Time.
Figure 4.11: DL+LP Reasoning Time.
Figure 4.12: Response Time of SPARQL Query upon Inference Model.
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4.4 COMPLEXITY VERSUS EXPRESSIVITY
In this section, we present computational complexity analysis of the framework. We also
investigate different solutions to mitigate the worst-case complexity.
Our framework uses reasoning in two phases of CBAC: design time and runtime. At
design time, we use it to determine possible conflicts and to check satisfiability of the
desired static security properties. At runtime, we use reasoning to verify if an access request
is permitted or denied by the system status. We also verify that the data is consistent
with corresponding the OWL restrictions. Our CBAC engine uses SPARQL-DL queries to
interact with context manager and to check its own decisions.
The DL-based reasoning in our approach is achieved via Pellet reasoner and LP reason-
ing using Jena inference forward-chaining. The description logic we use isALCRIQ(D),
which is a fragment of SROIQ(D). ALCRIQ(D) is the extended version ofALC which
supports axioms with the concept constructors u, unionsq, ∃, and ¬. Our model extends ALC
with role inclusions (R), inverse roles (I), qualified number of restrictions (Q) and con-
crete roles (D).
We use Datalog Safe-rules for Jena customary rules. Jena forward-chaining engine
uses RDF(S)-entailment rules for reasoning. RDF(S)-entailment is decidable and in NP-
Complete(d). If the target graph does not contain blank nodes [32, 34], then RDF(S)-
entailment is in P(d), where d is the number of nodes in RDF(S) graph.
ALCRIQ(D) reasoning has two components: Taxonomic reasoning (performed at
design time) and instance reasoning (performed at runtime). The computational complexity
of Taxonomic reasoning is determined based on the number of axioms (e.g., C v D).
It is NExpTime(n), where (n) is the number of axioms. The computational complexity
of instance (data) reasoning is determined by the number of facts (e.g., Doctor(John),
hasWeight(John, 70)) in the knowledge base. It is also in NExpTime(m), where (m) is
the number of facts.
Total computational complexity for ALCRIQ(D) is NExpTime(m)+NExpTime(n).
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In most practical applications the number of facts is far more than the number of axioms
in the DL knowledge base, hence the computational complexity of ALCRIQ(D) is taken
to be in NExpTime(m), where (m) is the number of facts.
DL ALCRIQ(D) reasoning complexity dominates Jena inference complexity, hence
the worst-case complexity of our framework is NExpTime(m).
To enhance the performance of reasoning, two approaches are largely used, which are:
using OWL 2 profiles or employing incremental DL reasoning.
4.4.1 USING OWL PROFILES
OWL 2 profiles are the result of imposing syntactic restrictions on OWL 2 ontologies.
OWL 2 has three profiles (sub-languages) EL, RL and QL. EL captures the expressive
power used by many OWL 2 ontologies. The basic reasoning problems in EL ontologies
can be performed in time that is polynomial with respect to the size of the ontology. Dedi-
cated reasoning algorithms for this profile are available and it has been shown that it can be
implementable in a highly scalable way. The EL acronym is based on the fact that it adopts
the family of description logics EL++. The QL profile is designed so that sound and com-
plete query answering is in LOGSPACE with respect to the size of the data (assertions),
while providing many of the main features necessary to express conceptual models such as
UML class diagrams and ER diagrams. The RL profile is aimed at applications that require
scalable reasoning without sacrificing too much expressive power. The design of RL was
inspired by Description Logic Programs (DLP) [30]. However, these sub-languages are
still very restrictive and can not be adopted for applications that require more expressive
power.
4.4.2 USING INCREMENTAL DL REASONING
Incremental reasoning [5, 44] means the ability of the reasoner to process updates (addi-
tions or removals) applied to an ontology without having to perform all the reasoning steps
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from scratch.
To account for incremental reasoning enhancement, our system ontologies are increased
via inserting new axioms, making the total size of the system knowledge base 16000 ax-
ioms. This size is dependent as a basic size which then increased. Then, we repeatedly
and randomly add 500 axioms to the system’s ontologies. At each iteration (starting from
16000 axioms and after every 500 axioms addition), the DL Pellet regular reasoner is exe-
cuted over the ontologies for ten times and the average time is calculated. For incremental
reasoning, we first execute the incremental reasoning on the basic size (the 16000 axioms
knowledge base) and then we add 500 axioms to the knowledge base without stopping
the reasoner, synchronize the reasoner execution over the new knowledge base and so on.
We calculate the average enhancement of incremental reasoning compared to the regular
reasoning as shown in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.13. This is given by the following simple
formula:
Enhancement Percentage = 1− Incremental reasoning time
Regular reasoning time
(4.16)
Table 4.2: Incremental versus regular Pellet reasoning performance enhancement for re-
peated 500 axioms addition to our model ontologies. All times are shown in milliseconds.
Implementation is achieved on a PC with Windows 10 3.8 GHz CPU, 32 GB RAM,and 2
TB HDD.
Axioms Regular Incremental Enhancement
reasoning reasoning percentage
16000 490.9 587.9 0.0%
16500 548.9 390.2 0.289%
17000 614.4 446.1 0.274%
17500 692.6 502.2 0.275%
18000 839.5 592.7 0.294%
18500 988.8 720.6 0.271%
The results shown in Figure 4.13 clarify that we can enhance the results shown in
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 with a good percentage and that enhancement can even add more
practical applicability to our framework.
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Figure 4.13: Regular Reasoning Compared to the Incremental Reasoning.
To enhance Jena inference, we use safe rules (also called Datalog rules) on top of RDF
facts to capture, in a uniform way, most of the OWL constraints useful in practice, while
guaranteeing a polynomial data complexity of reasoning and query answering.
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CHAPTER 5
CONTEXT DELEGATION
Delegating access privileges is a common practice of access control mechanisms. Dele-
gation is usually used for distributing responsibilities of task management among entities.
Delegation comes in two forms [19], GRANT and TRANSFER. In GRANT delegation,
a successful delegation operation allows delegated privileges to be available to both the
delegator and delegatee. In TRANSFER delegation, delegated privileges are no longer
available to the delegator. Although several delegation approaches have been proposed,
current models do not consider the issue of context delegation in context-based access con-
trol policies. We present two ontology-based context delegation approaches. Monotonic
context delegation, which adopts GRANT version of delegation, and non-monotonic for
TRANSFER version of delegation. The approach presented in this chapter provides a dy-
namic and adaptive privilege delegation for access control policies. We employ Description
logic (DL) and Logic Programming (LP) technologies for modeling delegation and to in-
clude it within CBAC authorization framework. We have designed the delegation ontology,
DEL, and semantically link it with Context-Based Access Control (CBAC). We show that
semantic-based techniques can be used to support adaptive and dynamic context delegation
for CBAC policies. We provide the formal framework of the approaches and show that they
are sound and preserve least-privilege principle.
The fundamental idea behind delegation is that some active entity in a system, the
delegator, delegates privileges to another active entity, the delegatee, to carry out some
functions on behalf of the former. Delegation in computer systems can be human to hu-
man, human to machine, machine to machine, and perhaps even machine to human. Most
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delegation models in the literature address human to machine and machine-to-machine
delegation [6]. Delegation of the privileges is an important mechanism to support dynamic
and adaptive access control in real world applications. It is usually used for distributing
responsibilities of task management among entities.
5.1 DELEGATION ONTOLOGY
Delegation ontology, DEL, shown in Figure 5.1, states that theDelegator is either a Source
of Authority (SoA), and in this case, she does not lose her access rights when she trans-
fers the Context associated with her to the Delegatee. Or she is not the SoA, and in this
case, she is going to lose her access rights to a resource when she transfers her access
rights to a Delegatee. Only the SoA have the right to set the value isSoA. This will
keep delegation chain under the control of SoA and guarantee that the delegation autho-
rization will not go infinite. Delegation has two types DelType to deal with the two
cases of delegation. The first type is when the Delegator transfers ("Transfer") her ac-
cess rights to the Delegatee and the second type is when the Delegator grants ("Grant")
her access rights to the Delegatee. A Delegation can be delegated by a Delegator
who grants/transfers a Context in case the Delegator is also the SoA) to a Delegatee
if that Delegatee satisfies certain conditions Condition. The delegated Context qualifies
the Delegatee to accomplish a specific type of Permission that is associated with the
Context on a certain Resource. If the Delegation isDelegatable and the MaxDepth of
the Delegation chain does not reach its limit yet, then the Delegatee can be a Delegator.
When Delegation is endowed to a Delegatee, some constraints Constraint are applied to
that granted/transferred Delegation according to what the Delegator has already specified
in the request. Delegation ontology also specifies that a Delegation can be authenticated
using some Credential. This meant to be used by the CBAC engine to authenticate dele-
gators before they can reach/change their delegation settings.
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Figure 5.1: Delegation Ontology.
5.2 CONTEXT DELEGATION
To delegate the context of an entity to another entity, we require that the delegator must have
the access privilege that is associated with context to be delegated. It is beneficial if we can
find a target entity with the same set of contextual attributes and their values. Satisfying this
requirement is not always possible, however. Delegating a subset of contextual attributes
(as it is the case with attribute delegation for ABAC) may result in a number of problems,
these problems are:
• Colluding, i.e., two entities may satisfy a policy that they could not if they acted
individually. For example, consider Figure 5.2, Joe and Alice can potentially collude
[68] to satisfy a policy that they could not if they acted individually. When this
context is delegated by our approach, the delegatee’s context, c2, is checked if it
already has time and role attributes, and if these satisfy the delegation constraints, the
corresponding contextual attributes of the delegator will not be merged with them.
Instead, a new context, c3, is created for the delegatee, and the chosen contextual
attributes are assigned to it. This way there will be no colluding among the contextual
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Figure 5.2: Attribute Delegation Problems Example.
attributes because c2 is not the same as c3.
• Inconsistent policy, i.e., the delegated privileges are conflicting the user’s original
privileges. For example, For example, Joe’s delegation of the role "Doctor" to Ann
will result in Ann’s delegated context that contains two values for the role attribute,
"Doctor" and "Nurse". If there was a policy rule such that ”role <> Nurse”, then
two different results would be possible depending on the value of role attribute. Our
approach avoids inconsistent policies by evaluating delegator’s context together with
the delegatee’s context.
• The third problem of delegating a context by merging attributes is that the result
does not reflect the real situation. For example, in Figure 5.2, and after delegating
the attribute "location" from Joe to Alice, the situation does not reflect the real status
of Alice anymore.
At the time of delegation, the delegator must have the context c that is to be delegated to the
delegatee. After the delegation is successfully completed, delegatee can use the delegated
context and the privilege(s) associated with it to access to a resource r. Our approach
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Figure 5.3: Delegation System Architecture.
imposes constrains on context delegation. The constraints may be specified by the delegator
or the system security officer. These constraints further restrict the delegation. Intuitively, if
the delegatee’s context satisfies the constraints, then the delegation is permitted. Otherwise,
the delegation will be aborted. Our model architecture is shown in Figure. 5.3.
Definition 5.1. (Delegation Request (DR)). Delegation request is given as a 6-tuple 〈
s1,s2,r,ac,DCs,Par〉, where s1, s2 ∈ Subject and they represent the delegator and dele-
gatee, respectively. r ∈ Resource, the resource to make the delegation over, ac ∈ Action,
the action and must be equal to ”delegate”, DCs ⊆ Constraint represents the set of con-
straints imposed by the delegator on delegatee’s context, and Par is a finite set of delega-
tion parameters, other than the delegation constraints, which are specified by the delegator.
Delegation parameters, Par, are given by:
Par = (n1, v1), ..., (nm, vm) (5.1)
Where ni represents the parameter namei and vi is the value of this parameter. Two im-
portant parameters in Par are very crucial for our approach. DelType and DelStatus,
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DelType is used to specify whether the delegation is of type GRANT or TRANSFER.
If DelType=TRANSFER, then the delegator must specify which kind of TRANSFER
to work with. One of the two values for the parameter DelStatus is used to do so, which
is either Permanent or Temporary. The meaning of these values is clear, Permanent is
used for permanent delegation and Temporary is for temporary delegation.
The DCs are represented as a set of pairs:
DCs = (CA1, Cons1), ...(CAn, Consn) (5.2)
Where CAi represents an attribute i and Consi is the delegation constraints set i (if any)
that is imposed overCA by the delegator and must be satisfied by the delegatee’s contextual
attributes.
5.2.1 DELEGATION POLICIES
Every delegation operation is subject to predefined delegation policies. Delegation policies
are rules that restrict the delegation. We represent our delegation policies in a predicate
form as follows:
can_delegate(s1, c1, s2, c2, ”GRANT”, DCs): subject s1 can delegate context c1 to
subject s2 if s2’s context satisfies delegation constraints DCs.
can_delegate(s1, c1, s2, c2, ”TRANSFER”, DCs): subject s1 can delegate context
c1 to subject s2 if s2’s context (the reference context) satisfies delegation constraints DCs.
can_revoke(s1, s2, c1, casCaded): subject s1 can revoke the delegated context c1 from
s2 if s1 is authorized to do so, i.e., it was the delegator of c1. Note that, the issue of
cascading revoke has been studied extensively and we will address this issue in future.
5.3 DELEGATION OPERATIONS
We assume that each delegation operation delegates only one context at a time. If the
delegator has multiple contexts (one is the instantiated context and the others may be gained
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by previous delegations) and (s)he wishes to delegate more than one context to the same
delegatee, (s)he can do that in multiple delegation operations. The delegation operation
takes the form delegate(s1, c1, s2, c2, ”Grant”, Par).
Figure 5.3 shows our approach architecture. Delegator s1 delegates context c1 to del-
egatee s2. After checking delegation constraints satisfaction as we have illustrated in the
previous subsection, the delegation algorithm creates a delegation instance with an iden-
tifier delid. The delegation instance gets part of its values from the delegation request,
namely from Par and DCs. We define the following parameters, MaxDepth is the depth
of the delegation. It specifies the number of times the context can be delegated. This value
is set by the first delegator (isSoA = true). The isDelegatable is a Boolean value that de-
termines whether the context is delegatable. If isDelegatable = false, then the algorithm
automatically sets MaxDepth to 0.
5.4 DELEGATION CONSTRAINTS
We represent delegation constraints, denoted as Cons, using Semantic Web Rule Lan-
guage safe rules (SWRL-safe). SWRL combines OWL ontologies with Horn Logic rules,
extending the set of OWL axioms to include Horn-like rules. SWRL rules have the syntax
Antecedent− >Consequent, where each Antecedent and Consequent consists of
atoms. These atoms can be of the formC(x), P (x, y), sameAs(x, y) or differentFrom(x
, y), where C is an OWL class, P is an OWL property, and x, y are either variables, OWL
individuals or OWL data values. The Consequent atom will be true if all atoms in the
Antecedent are true.
For example, suppose that Joe has OnDutyDoctor as a reference context and is given
as the axiom in equation 5.3.
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OnDutyDoctor ≡ Context u (User u ∃hasID.IDentity
u ∃hasRole.Role{Doctor} u ∃hasGroup.Group
{InShiftDoctors}) u (Environment{WorkingEnvrnt}
u ∃hasLocation.Location{Hospital}) u (TElement
{WorkingT ime} u ∃hasT ime{xsd : dateT ime
[≥ 2018− 04− 06T09 : 00 : 00,≤ 2018− 04− 06
T17 : 00 : 00]}) u ∃hasID.{0} (5.3)
Now suppose that Joe wants to set delegation constraint on the time contextual at-
tribute before delegating his context (his reference context) to another user, Ann. Ann is a
consultant doctor and she has the following reference context:
OnDutyConsult ≡ Context u (User u ∃hasID.IDentity
u ∃hasRole.Role{Consult} u ∃hasGroup.Group
{InShiftConsult}) u (Environment{WorkingEnvrnt}
u ∃hasLocation.Location{HospitalB}) u (TElement
{WorkingT ime} u ∃hasT ime{xsd : dateT ime
[≥ 2018− 04− 06T09 : 00 : 00,≤ 2018− 04− 06
T17 : 00 : 00]}) u ∃hasID.{0} (5.4)
The delegation constraint is (01:00pm ≥ time ≥10:00am), that is, it can only be delegated
between 10:00 am and 01:00 pm. At the time of delegation, Ann has an active context as
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shown below:
OnDutyConsult{Ann} ≡ Context u (User{Ann} u ∃
hasID.IDentity{Doctor643} u ∃hasRole.Role
{Doctor} u ∃hasGroup.Group{InShiftConsult})u
(Environment{WorkingEnvrnt} u ∃hasLocation
.Location{Hospital}) u (TElement{WorkingT ime}
u existshasT ime.T ime_Instance{xsd : dateT ime
[2018− 04− 06T14 : 23 : 00]}) u ∃hasID.{0} (5.5)
The CBAC engine checks, then, if the delegation constraints are satisfied or not. The
CBAC engine uses the following SWRL rule to check the time constraint:
TimeCons(?t3) ∧ notBefore(?t3, ?cons1) ∧ swrlb :
greaterThanOrEqual(?cons1, 10 : 00) ∧ notAfter
(?t3, cons2) ∧ swrlb : lessThanOrEqual(?cons2, 01 : 00)
− > satisfied(?t3) (5.6)
where t3=Time_Instance and is extracted from Ann’s active context and is equal to
12:30:11 pm (on April 6, 2018), and the constraints cons1=10:00 am and cons2=01:00
pm from the delegation constraints set by Joe.
5.5 ENFORCEMENT OF DELEGATED AUTHORIZATION
Non-monotonic context delegation (and delegation in general) needs to revise or contract
the underlying policy rules to make them adaptable to delegation operation. To this end,
non-monotonic delegation should be able to block, permanently or temporarily, some ac-
cess rules and prevent them from being activated. Doing so, however, will enforce the
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Figure 5.4: Naive Context Deletion.
policy engine to use negation to infer failure of some rules within the policy rule set. DL’s
ontologies and SWRL rules do not permit this kind of reasoning because they based on the
principle of Open World Assumption (OWA). OWA principle does not allow us to conclude
that a SWRL atom is false because OWA assumes it may become true in the future, and
hence, it assumes that atom’s value is "Unknown". On the contrary, in Logic Programming
(LP), which is based on Closed World Assumption (CWA), every atom or proposition that
is not proved to be true is considered as a false atom.
The naive approach for doing so can simply be achieved by removing the context c from
the CBAC knowledge base. However, this method ignores the fact that one context may
have access privileges to multiple resources. Figure. 5.4 illustrates this situation, when
subject s with context c can access resources r1...r5. When trying to prevent subject s with
context c from accessing resources r3 and r4 by deleting context c, then subject s will also
be prevented to access resources r1, r2, r5.
To remedy this situation, we propose to selectively block subject with specific con-
text from accessing certain resources via labeling the access path from that context to the
blocked resources using OWL object properties. The predicate update − cbac() is used
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Figure 5.5: Selective Context Blockade.
to block a subject s with context c and deprive it from accessing resource r. This is done
by inserting fresh OWL Object property instances, isTBlocked or isPBlocked, between
context c and resource r. isTBlocked is used for temporarily blockade, while isPBlocked
is used for permanent blockade Figure 5.5. Both isTBlocked or isPBlocked are defined
in CBAC ontology.
The enforcement of access control authorization with delegation is achieved via selec-
tive blocking of the context (and hence their associated subjects) from accessing certain
resources. Algorithm 2 is used for this purpose.
The context delegation (both monotonic and non-monotonic) is implemented via an-
swering the delegation request using Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 takes CBAC, Del, Ctx, RS and RQ, for Context-Based Access Con-
trol, delegation and context ontologies, respectively. RS is the access control rule-set and
RQ is an Access Request. The algorithm returns the updated ontologies CBAC, Del,
Ctx and the updated RS. The function parse(RQ) is used for parsing the request and to
check its syntax correctness. The function evaluateRQ(RT ) internally calls Algorithm
2 to enforce delegation-supported access authorization. Function dismantle(RT ) is used
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Algorithm 2 Delegation-Supported Access Authorization.
Input: CBAC, CBAC ontology, Del is a delegation ontology, RQ is an Access Request,
RS is access control rule-set.
Output: Access decision, either "Deny" or "Permit".
1: RT←parse(RQ) . RT = 〈s, r, ac〉
2: if RT = access then
3: sc←getContext(s);
4: if sc.Id 6= Null then
5: d_inst← consult(Del, sc.Id)
6: if Del has an RDF triple:(del : d_ins del : OnResource cbac : r) then
7: rc←getContext(r);
8: p←evaluate(s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS);
9: end if
10: if p = ”Permit” AND noConflict(p, s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS) then
11: Permit− Access;
12: exit();
13: else
14: Deny − Access;
15: exit();
16: end if
17: end if
18: if sc.Id = Null then
19: if Not(blocked(sc, r, CBAC)) then
20: rc←getContext(r);
21: p←evaluate(s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS);
22: end if
23: if p = ”Permit” AND noConflict(p, s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS) then
24: Permit− Access;
25: exit();
26: else
27: Deny − Access;
28: exit();
29: end if
30: end if
31: else
32: return(”Not access request”);
33: end if
69
Algorithm 3 Context Delegation Request Answering.
Input: CBAC, Del, Ctx are CBAC, delegation, and context Ontologies. RS is the access
control rule-set. RQ is an Access Request.
Output: UCBAC, UCtx, UDel . Updated context and delegation ontologies.
1: RT ← parse(RQ)
2: if RT = RQ then
3: evaluateRQ(RT );
4: exit();
5: end if
6: 〈s1, s2, r, ac,DCs, Par〉 ← dismantle(RT );
7: sc1←getContext(s1);
8: rc←getContext(r);
9: if isAuthorized(s1, sc1, r, rc, CBAC,RS) = false then
10: output(”s1 is not authorized to access r”);
11: exit();
12: end if
13: sc2←getContext(s2);
14: CAs←extractCAs(sc2);
15: T←checkSatisfiability(DCs,CAs);
16: if T = false then
17: output(”The context is not delegatable”);
18: exit();
19: end if
20: type←extract_type(Par)
21: if type = ”GRANT” then
22: UDel←createDelegationinstance(Del,〈s1, s2,
r, ac,DCs, Par〉, delid)
23: UCtx←createContext(Cx2, Ctx, delid)
24: return(UDel, UCtx)
25: exit()
26: else
27: UDel←createDelegationinstance(Del,〈s1, s2,
r, ac,DCs, Par〉, delid)
28: UCtx←createContext(Cx2, Ctx, delid)
29: UCBAC←update_cbac(CBAC,UDel,delid,sc1
,r)
30: return(UCBAC,UDel, UCtx)
31: exit()
32: end if
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to further partition the request into its elements, namely the delegator s1, the delegatee
s2, the resource r, delegation constraints DCs and delegation parameters Par. The func-
tion isAuthorized(s1, sc1, r, rc, CBAC,RS) is used to check whether s1 has the privi-
lege to access resource r. It uses Algorithm 2 to do that. Function extractCAs(X) is
used to extract the contextual attributes CAs from a given context axiom X . The func-
tion type = extract_type(Par) extracts, from a set of parameters found in Par, the type
of delegation. The checkSatisfiability(DCs,CAs) function checks the satisfiability of
contextual attributes of s2 against delegation constraints DCs set by s1.
5.6 PROCESSING DELEGATION REQUEST
This section demonstrates how Algorithm 3 processes context delegation. The approach
proceeds as follows:
• The delegator prepares a delegation request and sends it to the CBAC engine.
• The CBAC engine parses the request and starts the delegation process.
• The CBAC engine extracts the delegation constraints, asks the context manager for
the delegator’s context, and checks if the delegator has the delegation right.
• If the delegator is authorized, the CBAC engine asks the context manager for the
delegatee’s (s2) context and checks for satisfiability of the delegation.
• If the delegation is satisfied, the CBAC engine creates a delegation instance, see Fig-
ure. 5.1, using the delegation ontology and the parameters specified in the delegator’s
delegation request.
• The CBAC engine sends a request to the context manager, accompanied with a dele-
gation identifier, delid, to construct a generated context for s2. This context is a copy
of the delegator reference context but it is associated with the delegatee.
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• The context manager creates the generated context for s2 and associates it with the
identifier delid provided by the policy engine with the request.
• The delegatee has two contexts, the instantiated context and the generated context.
5.7 IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
Our delegation approach is carried out on Windows 8.1 machine with 1.9 GHz CPU, 4 GB
RAM and 500 GB HDD. When the design of our system ontologies is completed, we use
the on-line Freedatagenerator to generate unduplicated data instances in the form of excel
sheets. Then we use Cellfie plug-in for Protègè [53] to assert these instances to the model
ontologies.
The delegation constraint checking is implemented using SWRL rules as described
above. When executed, these rules check the satisfaction of the delegation constraints, and
if these constraints are satisfied, the delegation process proceeds to next step. Delegation
requests are issued by the users to CBAC engine. Figure 5.6 shows the results of our del-
egation approach simulation. The figure displays the time needed for completing different
numbers of delegation requests. All the results are averaged by 10 executions for each one.
Figure 5.6: Delegation Requests Processing Time.
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5.8 PROPERTIES AND PROOFS
In this section, we provide a proof that context delegation approach, as well as enforcing
the context delegation in access authorization are sound and preserve the Least-Privilege
principle. The function evaluate is given by Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 evaluate(s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS)
1: function evaluate(s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS)
2: RulesNo← getrulesnumber(RS);
3: infmodel← reason(CBAC);
4: for i← 1, RulesNo do
5: if RS[i] has the form:
(?rq rdf : type cbac : Request)
(?rq ctx : hasAction cbac : ac)
(?rq cbac : hasSubject ?s)
(?rq cbac : hasResource ?r)
(?s rdf : type ctx : sc)
(?r rdf : type ctx : rc)
(?rq cbac : hasDecision ?d)
− > (?d cbac : hasEffect cbac : p) then
6: if p = ”Permit” then
7: return(p);
8: exite();
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: p = ”Deny”
13: return(p);
14: end function
The function evaluate(s,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS) takes the access control ontology CBAC,
Figure 4.7, as input and achieves the DL-based reasoning to get the inferred model infmo−
del. The access control policy rules, represented as Jena forward inference rules, will be
applied on infmodel to derive an access decision. The function getrulesnumber(RS)
returns the number of rules in the access control policy rule-set RS. The Boolean function
noConflict(p,s,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS) given in Algorithm 5 works just like evaluate(s,sc,r
,rc,CBAC,RS) function but it returns a Boolean value if two conflicting rules (”Permit”
and ”Deny”) are fired at the same time.
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Algorithm 5 noConflict(p1, s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS)
1: function noConflict(p1, s, sc, r, rc, CBAC,RS)
2: RulesNo← getrulesnumber(RS);
3: infmodel← reason(CBAC);
4: for i← 1, RulesNo do
5: Let RSi has the form:
(?rq rdf : type cbac : Request)
(?rq ctx : hasAction cbac : ac)
(?rq cbac : hasSubject ?s)
(?rq cbac : hasResource ?r)
(?s rdf : type ctx : sc)
(?r rdf : type ctx : rc)
(?rq cbac : hasDecision ?d)
− > (?d cbac : hasEffect cbac : p1)
6: for j ← 1, RulesNo do
7: Let RSj has the form:
(?rq rdf : type cbac : Request)
(?rq ctx : hasAction cbac : ac)
(?rq cbac : hasSubject ?s)
(?rq cbac : hasResource ?r)
(?s rdf : type ctx : sc)
(?r rdf : type ctx : rc)
(?rq cbac : hasDecision ?d)
− > (?d cbac : hasEffect cbac : p2)
8: if (p1 = ”Permit” And p2 = ”Deny”) OR (p1 = ”Deny” And p2 =
”Permit”) then
9: return(False);
10: exite();
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
14: return(True);
15: end function
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Lemma 5.2. Given RS and CBAC correctly represented, the function evaluate(s,sc,r,rc
,CBAC,RS) will always return a correct authorization decision.
Proof Sketch. Assume the function evaluate(s,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS), when it is called, re-
turns false authorization decision. This decision could be derived in two cases: (i) The first
case is an example of traditional security violations that could take place in any system. For
example, a resource owner (or security officer) misconfigures her security settings, such as
incorrectly encoding Jena rules for access control policy. As a result, the system will adhere
to this misconfigured setting. (ii) There is no misconfigured security settings. In this case,
one of the following three conditions must be held: (a) The DL-based reasoning process
(step 2) returns inconsistent model. This assumption is invalid because we use DL-based
reasoner Pellet which is sound and complete with respect to OWL-DL . Hence, The system
knowledge base always has correct and consistent information. (b) RS 2 p, access control
rule-set does not model the decision p (p is neither ”Permit” or ”Deny”). If p ∈ RS, then
RS |= p. If p /∈ RS, then p must be generated by a Jena rule of the form:
a1 ∧ ... ∧ an → p (5.7)
where a1...an are RDF (Resource Description Framework) triples and p is an RDF triple
(or set of triples), and for each ai ∈ a1...an, RS |= ai, either by inference or by assertion.
If RS |= ai for all a1...an, then a1...an |= p, for p is either ”Permit” or ”Deny” (more pre-
cisely, ”Deny” is the default value returned by the function evaluate(s,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS)
when there is no rule of the form a1...an|= p). Hence, RS |= p which contradicts our as-
sumption that RS 2 p. (c) RS and/or CBAC are incorrectly represented. This contradicts
(a) above and our assumption that CBAC and RS are correctly represented. Hence, the
function evaluate(s,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS) will eventually derive a correct access decision
p.
Corollary 5.3. Given aCBAC andRS correctly represented, the function noConflict(p,s
,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS) will derive a correct Boolean value and terminates.
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Proof Sketch. Function noConflict(p,s,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS) works just like the function
evaluate(s,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS) does but after finding a decision p=”Permit”, it itera-
tively searches for p=”Deny”. If it happens to find two conflicting decisions, it will return
a true value. Otherwise, false value is returned. In Lemma 5.2, we have proved that the
function evaluate(s,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS) is sound (returns only correct answers). Hence,
noConflict(p,s,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS) follows from Lemma 5.2.
Theorem 5.4. (Algorithm 2 Soundness). Given a domain knowledge base that is correctly
represented using ontologies CBAC, CTX , DEL, and a set of Jena rules RS.
Proof Sketch. The proof is naturally follows from Lemma 5.2 and Corollary 5.3.
Lemma 5.5. Function checkSatisfiability(DCs,CAs) is decidable and sound.
Proof Sketch. We use only SWRL-Safe rules in our delegation and CBAC ontologies. A
SWRL rule is DL-safe if every variable in the rule head occurs in a Datalog atom in the
body. SWRL-Safe rules are known to be decidable, sound, consistent and complete (refer
to [52] for the complete proof).
Algorithm 6 update_cbac(CBAC,UDel, delid, sc1, r)
1: function update_cbac(CBAC,UDel, delid, sc1, r)
2: D ←get_Instance(UDel, delid);
3: if D.isPermanent = ”False” then
4: UCBAC ← CBAC ∪ opAssertion(sc1, r, ”isTBlock”);
5: else
6: UCBAC ← CBAC ∪ opAssertion(sc1, r, ”isPBlock”);
7: end if
8: return(UCBAC);
9: exit();
10: end function
Lemma 5.6. The function update_cbac(CBAC,UDel,delid,sc1,r) is decidable, sound and
consistent.
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Proof Sketch. All ontology-based operations in this function, namely get_Instance() and
opAssertion() (for object Property assertion) are decidable, sound and complete [4, 37].
Theorem 5.7. (Algorithm 3 Soundness). Given a domain knowledge base that is correctly
represented using ontologies CBAC, CTX , DEL, and a set of Jena rules RS.
Proof Sketch. The proof is naturally follows from proof of Theorem 2, Lemma 5.5 and
Lemma 5.6.
We have shown that Algorithms 2 and 3 are sound. Remains to prove that the model
in which context delegation is used is consistent, no contradicting decisions are derived for
one access request.
Theorem 5.8. (Model Consistency). Given a model represented by a domain knowledge
base that is correctly represented using ontologies CBAC, CTX , DEL, and a set of Jena
rules RS. Delegation operation always results in consistent access authorization decisions
("Permit" and "Deny" are never both derived as answers for the same access request).
Proof Sketch. LetM be the model of our approach and is given byM=CBAC∪ CTX
∪ DEL. Our model employs two types of reasoning techniques, monotonic reasoning
which is achieved by DL-based Pellet reasoner on the model ontologies before any access
authorization or delegation operation is made and non-monotonic reasoning, which is ap-
plied using Jena forward chaining. Monotonic reasoning has been proven to be decidable,
sound, complete and consistent [4, 37]. That means for every sound and consistent model
M, there is an inference modelMF = Inf(M), where Inf is the DL-based reasoning
operation, MF is also sound and consistent model. Hence, while the model is correctly
represented (this is given), so all DL-based inferences produce sound and consistent output
models. However, this fact does not solve the problem of possible inconsistencies that may
be resulted when deriving an answer for a request (it is possible to reach to a conclusion
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that the decision is both "Permit" and "Deny" while both of them belong to the same class
in the CBAC ontology and not for disjoint classes). Our model solves this problem by
using Jena rules (function noConflict(p,s,sc,r,rc,CBAC,RS)) which returns a true value
when conflicting decision is reached. Hence, the model M is consistent and any model
MF that is resulted by either monotonic reasoning or non-monotonic reasoning is also
consistent (in respect to conflicting access decisions).
Theorem 5.9. (Least-Privilege Principle). Given a domain knowledge base that is cor-
rectly represented using ontologies CBAC, CTX , DEL, and a set of Jena rules RS.
Algorithms 2 and 3 (Delegation-Supported Context Delegation) always preserve the Least-
Privilege Principle when executes a delegation request.
Proof Sketch. In this proof, we combine two proofs of Algorithms 2 and 3 preserve Least-
Privilege Principle. Assume that Algorithms 2 and 3 do not preserve Least-Privilege Prin-
ciple. This would happen in two situations:
(i) Delegatee acquires more privileges that (s)he supposed to have according to the pol-
icy in use. For example, delegatee may acquire, as a result of context delegation
operation, access to more than the specified resource(s) or/and can use more than
one access type (write/read/execute) on a specific resource. Our approach restricts
the delegatee access to a specific resource (and the type of this access) according to
the delegation ontology. In (step 4) of Algorithm 2, we check whether the context
is a delegated or an instantiated context (sc.Id = X or sc.Id = Null, X is any
non-zero integer value). If it is a delegated context, then the algorithm checks if the
delegation instance d_ins is applicable on a resource r by checking existence of RDF
triple (del1 : d_ins del : OnResource cbac : r) in delegation ontology (step 6).
Only in this case the delegatee with context sc is permitted to access resource r in
ontology CBAC. Otherwise, access is denied. But this violates our assumption that
1del, cbac and ctx are prefixes for delegation, CBAC and context ontologies
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Algorithms 2 and 3 do not preserve Least-Privilege Principle. Hence, Algorithms 2
and 3 preserve Least-Privilege Principle for the delegatee accessing a resource in the
knowledge based.
(ii) Delegator has transferred her context sc to the delegatee, but she is still able to use
it for accessing resource r. Algorithm 3 (step 29) updates the CBAC ontology by
inserting an RDF triple (ctx : c cbac : isPBlock cbac : r), for permanent delegation,
and (ctx : c cbac : isTBlock cbac : r), for temporary delegation). In this way,
when delegator tries to access resource r using a context sc that she has already
permanently or temporarily transferred it to the delegatee, then the algorithm will
discover that this context is blocked from access resource r (step 19 of Algorithm 2).
Again, this violates our assumption that Algorithms 2 and 3 do not preserve Least-
Privilege Principle. Hence, Algorithms 2 and 3 preserve Least-Privilege Principle for
the delegator accessing a resource in the knowledge based.
Example 5.10. Suppose that we have the following policy rule: 〈s ,c1, ”Ann Health
Record”, Nil, +, ”read”〉 and that c1 is given by the DL axiom:
c1 ≡ User(Alice) u ∃hasRole(Analyst) u ∃hasT ime(t1) u ∃hasLocation
(HosptialLab) u ∃hasActivity(Working)
Assume also that the contextual attribute t1 has a constraint, Constraint, (08:0 am≤
t1 ≤ 05:0 pm) and Alice’s context satisfies this constraint. Assume now Alice intends
to delegate her context c1 to Bob from 10:00 am to 01:00 pm and this context is not
delegatable. Bob has the following context:
c2 ≡ User(Bob) u ∃hasRole(Doctor) u ∃hasT ime(t2) u ∃
hasLocation(Hosptial) u ∃hasActivity(Working)
The contextual attribute t2 has the constraint (09 : 0AM ≤ t2 ≤ 03 : 0PM). To
delegate context c1 to Bob, Alice prepares a delegation request which has the form:
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Figure 5.7: Delegation Instance for Bob.
〈Alice,Bob,Ann′s Health Record,”delegate”, 〈Time, (10 : 0AM ≤ t3 ≤ 01 :
0PM)〉〉
Alice sends the delegation request to the CBAC engine. The CBAC engine asks the
context manager for Bob’s context and checks for satisfiability of the delegation. If the
delegation is satisfied, the CBAC engine creates a delegation instance del1 with the enti-
ties shown in Figure 5.7. The new context is similar to Alice’s context except that it is
associated with Bob.
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CHAPTER 6
SEMANTIC-BASED OBLIGATION
The problem we tackle in this chapter is the absence of precise formal specification, based
on the domain’s semantic representation given in chapters 4 and 5, for semantic-based
obligation and how access control policy should comply to that obligation. We present
an extension of the CBAC framework to accommodate a general notion of an obligation,
obtaining a formal semantic-based framework for modeling and enforcing access control
policies that involve obligations. The approach that we develop in this chapter provides a
declarative specification for enforcing and monitoring obligations.
6.1 OBLIGATION-DEPENDENT AUTHORIZATION
In context-based authorization, a requester of a resource (the subject) sends a request to the
policy engine which, in its turn, parses the request and apply its rules to check whether all
the conditions are satisfied or not, with the context involved, to reach a decision (Deny or
Permit). The conditions checked by the policy engine before the access is permitted and
are related to the past or present are called provisions. Obligations represent conditions
associated with the future and the policy engine should be able to check whether an obli-
gation that is associated with accessing a specific resource is met. Checking obligations
compliance to the policy rules is a very complex task, especially in dynamic environments,
because it requires the ability to keep track of the changes that are occurring in specific
domain’s sphere. Two types of obligations are well-known in the field of access control,
user obligations and system obligations. User obligations are imposed by the systems on
the users (subjects). System obligations denote actions which should be immediately taken
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when some conditions become true. For example, when an attack is detected on a server,
the system is committed to block the source address of the attacker. System obligations are
enforced by mechanisms implemented in the system [24].
Integrating obligations into CBAC control policy increases the flexibility of the man-
agement and easy maintenance of the security system. Such a combination allows a sys-
tem to react quickly to new circumstances and change obligation requirements easily when
flaws in existing policies are discovered [24].
However, in addition to the fact that only a few of the current methods [27, 55, 58,
59] provide obligation for context-based access control policies, none of the approaches
satisfies the following requirements combined:
• Adaptability: Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) is aimed at working in dy-
namic environments. To work in such dynamic environments, CBAC should be
adaptable to the ever-changing conditions. For this reason, any obligation approach
that is meant to work for CBAC must adhere to the adaptability principle exists in
dynamic environments.
• Extensibility: No obligation approach can support all types of obligations exist in
real life applications. Executing obligations by users or systems is highly depend
on application and policy requirements in the system, which can be quite diverse.
Hence, the design must be extensible to support new types of obligations that bring
around the new arising requirements.
• Modularity and Flexibility: Access control frameworks do not use obligation for all
their authorization decisions. They use it in some situations that require specific
conditions or actions to be fulfilled by either the users or the system after the autho-
rization decision is made. Designing a framework that includes obligation services
in a modular form permits flexible activating and deactivating obligations within the
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access control framework. If policy engine needs to create an obligation instance, it
would be easier and more flexible to call the module specified for this job.
6.2 SEMANTIC-BASED OBLIGATION
To satisfy the above requirements, our obligation mechanism provides the following: 1)
Dynamic and adaptive semantic-based obligation for CBAC policies. Dynamic adaptability
is provided through policy adjustment operations that keep the policy rules on update with
the latest context’s changes. Adaptation is needed, in our approach, in situations: (i) When
context of the requester, resource, or environment changes, that change should be reflected
on the access control policy. (ii) When obligation is evolved in due time, access control
permissions have to reflect the new evolving state of the system and this needs the policy
to be updated to cope with this situation. 2) Our approach can be adopted by existing
CBAC systems which do not provide obligation services. 3) Our semantic-based obligation
supports capabilities such as checking the access control and obligation policies for conflict
and consistency, explaining inferences and helping to instantiate and validate the variables
in dynamic environments.
We present a motivating scenario that will be used as a running example throughout the
rest of this chapter.
Motivating example "A university Travel Authorization (TA) is a means that gives the
students and advisors a permission to travel as its official representatives for conferences,
competition, or colloquiums. When completed, these TAs are used by the university to reim-
burse the representatives what they already have paid as registration/traveling/participation
fees. The representative should be a registered student (or an advisor) within the university
before being able to apply for a TA. Also, the representative should provide a registration
proof for a conference or a colloquium to be able to complete the TA. Furthermore, and for
more secure transactions, a representative must be logged into the university network (from
within the campus) to complete the TA. Another more radical requirement that must be met
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by students (not advisors) is that applying for a TA is only available between 08:00 am and
05:00 pm. After logging into the university network and completing the TA form, the system
initializes and activates an obligation for the representative. A representative is obligated
to turn in itemized receipts within fifteen (15) days of the conference taking place. When
a representative finalized submitting itemized receipts, the system is obliged to reimburse
the representative either by issuing e-check, direct deposit to representative account, or a
hard copy check that is to be sent to the representative physical address later. Larsa (the
obligatee) is a PhD student at USC university and she applied for TA. The system (the obli-
gator) initialized an obligation to be met by Larsa later. The obligation includes Larsa’s
commitment to submit her TA’s itemized receipts. The system set deadlines for Larsa to
satisfy the obligation requirements. If Larsa satisfies the obligation’s requirements, then
the obligation is fulfilled and the system should obliged itself to accomplish its obligation
by issuing Larsa a reimbursement payback. On the contrary, if Larsa does not fulfill her
obligation, then the obligation is violated and the system may activate sanction/reaction
policies and it does not have to create and activate an obligation for itself."
This scenario illustrates the need for an obligation approach for Context-Based Access
Control policies. To provide solutions for the requirements mentioned in introduction of
this chapter, we develop a framework, see Figure 6.1, with the following building blocks:
• CBAC engine: In addition to the context-based authorization presented in Chapter 4,
a policy engine is responsible to set up obligation policies. CBAC engine uses two
modules: obligation enforcer and obligation monitor. Obligation monitor continu-
ously monitors the system state over the time, while obligation enforcer is used to
create, activate, enforce and deactivate the obligations.
• The context manager receives requests from the policy engine asking for a specific
context. In its response to these requests, the context manager gathers, annotates,
processes, and reasons over the gathered data to produce the context. Then it sends
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Figure 6.1: Architectural View of the Obligation Framework.
the resulted context to the policy engine.
• System ontologies: Using ontologies is important to obligation in the following gen-
eral aspects:
– to be used for semantic-based system description, which enables both fine-
grained and coarse-grained obligation mechanisms and to link these mecha-
nisms to authorization mechanisms.
– to be used in the dynamic establishment of obligation policies, which are used
later to enforce and dispense the privileges and commitments of the obligation.
The OBL ontology, shown in Figure 6.2, states that once the Obligation is created,
it can be in one of two temporal states Persistent or Transient. In case of per-
sistent obligation, all the data associated with the obligation should be saved by the
system. For transient obligation, the data associated with obligation is only avail-
able for a short period of time. The created obligation also can be in one of the
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following operational states, Fulfilled, Pending, V iolated (these are specified by
CBAC ontology as we will see later). Obligation can also be a system obligation or
a user obligation via setting a value for the data property isUserObl. Value of True
means it is a user obligation, while False value is for system obligation. Obligation
is imposed on a Subject (a system or a user) to oblige her/him/it to perform some
Action before getting further access to a Resource (data or services). Deadlines of
the obligations are specified using hasTFrame object property, which in turn uses
two properties withST ime and withETime.
Figure 6.2: Basic Concepts of Obligation ontology.
6.3 SEMANTIC-BASED OBLIGATION FOR CBAC
In traditional CBAC authorization, the context plays the role of a bridge between a subject
requesting an access and the requested resource, see Figure 6.3 (a). If a subject has the
context, then (s)he can access the resource. In obligation-supported CBAC authorization,
the bridge is represented by a context plus the fulfilled obligation. If a subject has the
context and has fulfilled the obligation associated with that request, then (s)he can access
the resource, see Figure 6.3 (b).
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Figure 6.3: Subject Generic Context.
Our justification for the idea of context-dependent obligation is that in many situations,
a resource is only when a subject works under certain context, see our example
To impose an obligation oblig on a subject s, we assume that subject s has already
gained some sort of authorized access that permits s to access resource rs. We differentiate
between two types of the context: reference context and obligation context.
Definition 6.1. (Reference Context c). A context that is not associated with an obligation
(or delegation) and is instantiated by context manager. We already have mentioned this
context in Chapter 4.
Definition 6.2. (Obligation Context oc). A context that is, based on a traditional context
received, dynamically generated by CBAC engine and associated with an obligation.
The reason for creating a new context by CBAC engine is that CBAC authorization
framework has not to be modified. Also, the CBAC policy rules will stay intact (no change
is needed).
Obligation context oc, is generated based on reference context, but it is slightly differ-
ent. The major difference between them is that the obligation context is associated with an
obligation. That obligation is always related with a specific action ac1 (or a set of actions
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a1,...,am). Also, the obligation is a satisfying component for oc, i.e., oc is unsatisfiable un-
less o is satisfied. One more difference between c and oc is that the oc is always dynamically
generated by CBAC engine, while c is instantiated by context manager.
Creation of specific obligation is achieved in conjunction with an authorization decision
enforcement. After its creation, an obligation must be activated. Activation of an obligation
is triggered by certain events (like time elapsing, action applied on a resource...etc). An
obligation must be created before it can be fulfilled, pending, or violated. These are the
states an obligation can take during its evolution and they are as follows [51, 27]:
• Pending: the obligation is activated by the CBAC engine but it is not yet fulfilled or
violated (its axiom is not satisfied yet, but still its deadline has not been reached).
• Fulfilled: the obligation is activated by the CBAC engine and its axiom is satisfied.
Satisfying the obligation axiom is achieved via instantiation after making a DL rea-
soning.
• Violated: the obligation is activated by the CBAC engine and is not fulfilled before
its deadline elapsed.
The extended CBAC ontology, Figure 6.4 uses three properties to control the obligation
process. These properties are committedTo, hasObligation and oblig_ID. The property
committedTo is used by CBAC engine to check if there is an obligation associated with
the current decision. If there is one, it calls the oblig_enforcer module to enforce it via
executing obligation policy specified for that matter. Property hasObligation is used to
create an obligation and link it to the current decision so that the subject will further be
granted more privileges if (s)he/it satisfies it. Each obligation has a unique identifier to
recognize it from other obligations and is hold by oblig_ID. To monitor obligation evolu-
tion, the CBAC engine consults CBAC ontology to do so. It checks following operational
states, Fulfilled, Pending, V iolated, which tell the state the obligation is in. The val-
ues of these states are modified by obligation enforcer and being monitored by obligation
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monitor. Also, an obligation is associated with an Action that is requested by the subject
through the object property isRelatedTo. The reason behind this relevance relation is that
each obligation has a relatedness with action. For example, if a subject request to access a
resource and the related obligation with that action is to provide a valid driver license num-
ber, then the CBAC engine asks (as obligation) the subject to provide his/her bank account
information, then in this case, the system violates the relevance relation.
Figure 6.4: Core Concepts of the Extended CBAC Ontology.
We should note that the authorization decision in presence of obligation may be differ-
ent than the authorization decision alone. This is because CBAC engine does not follow
the same decision procedure. The obligation is given by the tuple Oblig(s,sc,ac,r,OblP ),
where s ∈ Subject, sc is the subject’s context (SContext), r ∈ Resource, ac ∈ Action,
OblP is obligation parameters, which include [ts,te] to refer to the time interval at which
the obligation must be satisfied, TFrame, ps ∈ OPState and tss ∈ TState.
We represent obligation policies in a predicate form as follows:
is_obliged(CBAC, p): To check if the decision is associated with an obligation to be
enforced. The first parameter is CBAC ontology and the second parameter is the decision
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previously returned by evaluate(s, sc, r, CBAC,RS) function (it is the same function of
Chapters 4 and 5. This function is called after Permit decision is made.
is_committed(CBAC, p): This predicate, if returns True, means that the request is
associated with an obligation and that obligation must be enforced before granting ac-
cess. Same as is_obliged(CBAC, p) function, except that this function is called before the
Permit decision is made.
deactivate(OBL,CBAC, oblig_ID): Deactivate the obligation by deallocating its in-
stances from OBL and CBAC ontologies.
oblig_ID ← get_oblig_ID(s, CBAC): Gets the obligation identifier.
enforce_oblig(oblig_ID,CBAC,OBL, s, sc, ac, r, OblP ): Enforces the obligation for
the request in hand. This predicate reads as follows: subject s working under context sc
should take the action ac on the resource r only when (s)he fulfills the obligation which is
recognized by an identifier oblig_ID and parameters OblP .
Assume now we have a reference context that represents student’s context when in
campus as is shown in DL axiom 6.1. Also assume that Larsa has an active context at the
time a request is made and it is shown in DL axiom 6.2.
AtCampusStudent ≡ Context u (User u ∃hasID.IDentity
u ∃hasRole.Role{Student} u ∃hasGroup.Group
{ActiveStudents}) u (Environment{WorkingEnvrnt}
u ∃hasLocation.Location{UnivCampus}) u (TElement
{WorkingT ime} u ∃hasT ime{xsd : dateT ime
[≥ 2019− 09− 06T08 : 00 : 00,≤ 2019− 09− 06
T17 : 00 : 00]}) u ∃hasID.ID (6.1)
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AtCampusStudent ≡ Context u (User{Larsa}) u ∃hasID.IDentity
{Student563} u ∃hasRole.Role{Student} u ∃hasGroup.Group
{ActiveStudents}) u (Environment{WorkingEnvrnt}
u ∃hasLocation.Location{UnivCampus}) u (TElement
{WorkingT ime} u ∃hasT ime{xsd : dateT ime
[2019− 09− 06T11 : 34 : 00]}) u ∃hasID.ID{0} (6.2)
The obligations are specified using DL axioms. For example, the obligation that is used
to obligate a subject to finalize submitting TA itemized receipts is represented using the DL
axiom shown in 6.3.
GenTAOblig ≡ ∃hasObligID.ObligID u ∃hasTState.TState
u ∃hasTFrame.(TimeFrame u ∃withST ime.xsd : dateT ime
u ∃withETime.xsd : dateT ime) u ∃isUserOblig.xsd : boolean
u ∃obligedOn.(Subject u AtCampusStudent u ∃obligedToDo.Action)
(6.3)
This is only a generic obligation axiom. Based on this generic obligation, we will
specify another obligation to represent a reference obligation. For example, the reference
obligation for our example is given by the DL axiom shown below (axiom 6.4):
RefTAOblig ≡ ∃hasObligID.ObligID u ∃hasTState.TState{transient}
u ∃hasTFrame.(tframe1 u ∃withST ime.{xsd : dateT ime[2019− 09− 05T08 :
00 : 00]} u ∃withETime.{xsd : dateT ime[2019− 09− 19T17 : 00 : 00]})
u ∃isUserOblig.{xsd : boolean[True]} u ∃obligedOn.(Subject u AtCampusStudent
u ∃obligedToDo.Action{submit_TA_receipts}) (6.4)
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Algorithm 7 is used to compute the obligation within CBAC framework.
Algorithm 7 Obligation-Supported Access Authorization.
Input: CBAC, CBAC ontology, OBL is a obligation ontology, RQ is an Access Request,
RS is access control rule-set.
OblP is obligation parameters
Output: Access decision, either "Deny" or "Permit".
1: RT←parse(RQ) . RT = 〈s, r, ac〉
2: if RT = access then
3: sc←getContext(s);
4: p←evaluate(s, sc, r, CBAC,RS);
5: if p = ”Permit” AND noConflict(p, s, sc, r, CBAC,RS) then
6: if is_committed(CBAC, p) then
7: oblig_ID ← get_oblig_ID(s, CBAC)
8: enforce_oblig(oblig_ID,CBAC,OBL, s, sc, ac, r, OblP )
9: Permit_Access;
10: exit();
11: end if
12: if is_obliged(CBAC, p) then
13: enforce_oblig(oblig_ID,CBAC,OBL, s, sc, ac, r, OblP )
14: Permit_Access;
15: exit();
16: end if
17: else
18: Deny_Access;
19: exit();
20: end if
21: else
22: return(”Not access request”);
23: end if
Let’s return to our motivating example. Assume now Larsa needs to finalize her TA and
she already submitted the TA application. At the moment of trying to finalize the TA ap-
plication, the CBAC engine instantiate the following obligation instance (active obligation)
of Larsa:
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TAOblig ≡ ∃hasObligID.ObligID{ObligAA563} u ∃hasTState.TState{transient}
u ∃hasTFrame.(tframe1 u ∃withST ime.{xsd : dateT ime[2019− 09− 05T08 : 00
: 00]} u ∃withETime.{xsd : dateT ime[2019− 09− 19T17 : 00 : 00]})
u ∃isUserOblig.{xsd : boolean[True]} u ∃obligedOn.(Subject{Larsa}
u AtCampusStudent{Larsa} u ∃obligedToDo.Action{submit_TA_receipts})
(6.5)
To grant Larsa a permit to finalize her TA, the CBAC engine creates an obligation
context (oc), based on Larsa’sAtCampusStudent. Let’s call this FinalizingTAStudent,
and is given as follows:
FinalizingTAStudent ≡ Context u (User u ∃hasID.IDentity
u ∃hasRole.Role{Student} u ∃hasGroup.Group
{ActiveStudents}) u (Environment{WorkingEnvrnt}
u ∃hasLocation.Location{UnivCampus}) u (TElement
{WorkingT ime} u ∃hasT ime{xsd : dateT ime
[≥ 2019− 09− 01T08 : 00 : 00,≤ 2018− 09− 14
T17 : 00 : 00]}) u ∃hasObligation.(Obligation u ∃hasObligID.ObligID) (6.6)
This axiom represents the reference obligation context. We should note that this context
can be written as:
FinalizingTAStudent ≡ Context u ∃hasObligation.(Obligation u ∃hasObligID.
ObligID) (6.7)
The active context of this reference oc is given as:
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FinalizingTAStudent{Larsa} ≡ Context u (User{Larsa} u ∃
hasID.IDentity{Srudent563} u ∃hasRole.Role
{Student} u ∃hasGroup.Group{ActiveStudents})u
(Environment{WorkingEnvrnt} u ∃hasLocation
.Location{UnivCampus}) u (TElement{WorkingT ime}
u hasT ime.T ime_Instance{xsd : dateT ime
[2019− 09− 05T14 : 23 : 00]}) u ∃hasObligation.({obl1}
hasObligID.ObligID{ObligAAA569}) (6.8)
This concept states that Larsa is under FinalizingTAStudent at time 2:23 pm on
September 5, 2019, if she is under the AtCampusStudent context and has an obligation
obl1 with an ID ObligAAA569. One distinguishing property of our obligation approach is
that it partially depends on the context of the user. This is because the obligation specifi-
cation depends on the user’s context, i.e., the obligation axiom has one important element
which is user context. Using the obligation axiom and the context under which the user
operates, a new context is automatically derived to serve as a new context which we already
call the obligation context (oc) to recognize it from ordinary context. Figure 6.5 illustrates
this dependency. Now assume we have following obligation business rule: The policy rule
Table 6.1: Obligation rule for the running example.
No. Rule
Rule: A student who is with con-
text FinalizingTAStudent
can finalize the on-line TA ap-
plication.
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Figure 6.5: Context-Obligation Dependency.
for this business rule is specified using Jena rule as follow (rule 6.9):
[rule :
(?r rdf : type cbac : Request)
(?r ctx : hasType oblig : TA finalize)
(?r cbac : hasSubject ?s)
(?s rdf : type oblig : FinalizingTAStudent)
(?r cbac : hasResource ?rs)
(?r cbac : hasDecision ?d)
− > (?d cbac : hasEffect cbac : Permit)]
(6.9)
6.4 CHECKING OBLIGATION STATES
One of the crucial tasks in obligation is how to define and track its states. For temporal
states (transient or persistent), we let the system determine these states. In our implemen-
tation, we assign random values to them during program execution. For operational states,
however, it is important to specify these states precisely and be able to devise a method
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for monitoring their transitions. We have three major operational states (some researchers
might add to these three states). We use SWRL (Semantic Web Rule Language) to specify
and trigger operational state transitions. These are as follows:
• Fulfilled: An obligation is Fulfilled when its satisfaction conditions are met by the
subject. For example, when the credit card holder submits a monthly fee in full
before the due date, there will be no additional charge on her/his card. The SWRL
rule below specifies a fulfillment condition for a fulfilled obligation:
Obligation(?x) ∧ hasTFrame(?x, ?g) ∧ withST ime(?g, ?g1)
∧ withETime(?g, ?g2) ∧ isReletedTo(?x, ?z) ∧ obligedOn(?x, ?y)
∧ obligedToDo(?y, ?z) ∧ ofType(?z, ?s) ∧ swrlb :
stringEqualIgnoreCase(?s, ”submit_TA_receipt”) ∧ AtCampusStudent(?y)
∧ hasTElement(?y, ?y1) ∧ hasT ime(?y1, ?t) ∧ swrlb :
lessThanOrEqual(?t, ?g2) ∧ swrlb : greaterThanOrEqual(?t, ?g1)
− > Fulfilled(?x)
• Pending: Obligation can be in Pending state in two situations: The action requested
by a subject is issued in before the start time of the obligation. For example, if the
current date is September 2 2019, and the policy says that starting from September
5 2019, 10:00 am, a tenant should pay a service fee of $45. The SWRL rule below
specifies a pending condition for a pending obligation, where t2 is a variable that
holds current time. Also, the action requested by a subject may not related to the
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obligation, but the due date/time of the obligation is still valid (does not elapse yet).
Obligation(?x) ∧ hasTFrame(?x, ?g) ∧ withST ime(?g, ?g1)
∧ withETime(?g, ?g2) ∧ isRelatedTo(?x, ?z) ∧ obligedOn(?x, ?y)
∧ obligedToDo(?y, ?z) ∧ ofType(?z, ?s) ∧ swrlb :
stringEqualIgnoreCase(?s, ”submit_TA_receipt”)∧
AtCampusStudent(?y) ∧ hasTElement(?y, ?y1) ∧ hasT ime(?y1, ?t)∧
swrlb : lessThanOrEqual(?t, ?g2) ∧ swrlb : greaterThanOrEqual(?t, ?g1)
CurrentT ime(?t2) ∧ ctx− lite : hasT ime(?t2, ?t3)
∧ swrlb : lessThan(?t3, ?g2)− > Pending(?x)
The SWRL rule below recognizes this case:
Obligation(?x) ∧ hasTFrame(?x, ?g) ∧ withST ime(?g, ?g1)
∧ withETime(?g, ?g2) ∧ isRelatedTo(?x, ?z) ∧ obligedOn(?x, ?y)
∧ obligedToDo(?y, ?z) ∧ ofType(?z, ?s) ∧ swrlb :
stringEqualIgnoreCase(?s, ”submit_TA_receipt”) ∧ AtCampusStudent(?y)
∧ hasTElement(?y, ?y1) ∧ hasT ime(?y1, ?t) ∧ swrlb :
lessThanOrEqual(?t, ?g2) ∧ swrlb : greaterThanOrEqual(?t, ?g1)
CurrentT ime(?t2) ∧ ctx− lite : hasT ime(?t2, ?t3)
∧ swrlb : lessThan(?t3, ?g2)− > Pending(?x)
• Violated: The action requested by a subject is related to the obligation, but the due
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date/time of the obligation is invalid (already elapsed).
Obligation(?x) ∧ hasTFrame(?x, ?g) ∧ withST ime(?g, ?g1)
∧ withETime(?g, ?g2) ∧ isReletedTo(?x, ?z) ∧ obligedOn(?x, ?y)
∧ obligedToDo(?y, ?z) ∧ ofType(?z, ?s) ∧ swrlb :
stringEqualIgnoreCase(?s, ”submit_TA_receipt”) ∧ AtCampusStudent(?y)
∧ hasTElement(?y, ?y1) ∧ hasT ime(?y1, ?t) ∧ swrlb :
lessThanOrEqual(?t, ?g2) ∧ swrlb : greater(?t, ?g1)
− > V iolated(?x)
We should note that for all situations that need to delete instance from the knowledge
base, we use Java-based API’s to achieve them. This is due to the inability of Semantic-
Web technologies to do that alone.
6.5 IMPLEMENTATION
Our obligation implementation is carried out on Windows 8.1 machine with 1.9 GHz CPU,
4 GB RAM and 500 GB HDD. After designing our system ontologies, we use the on-line
Freedatagenerator to generate unduplicated data instances in the form of excel sheets. Then
we use Cellfie plug-in for Protègè to assert these instances to the model ontologies. The
rules used for this purpose are based on Java Script Object Notation (JSON) [28]. For
example, we use the following JSON rule to assert instances and set their type to Thing
OWL class (most general class in OWL language). Then this rule links those instances
with other instances using the object properties obligedOn, hasObligID, hasTStatus,
withDuration, and hasTFrame, in addition to a data property isUserOblig.
{"Collections":[{"sheetName":"Sheet1","startColumn":"A","endColumn":"A",
"startRow":"2","endRow":"+","comment":"","rule": Individual: @H*
Types: owl:Thing
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Facts: obligedOn @N*,
hasObligID @M*,
hasTStatus @A*,
withDuration @L*,
hasTFrame @O*,
isUserOblig @E* (xsd:boolean)}]}
The obligation’s state checking and transition are implemented using SWRL rules as
described above. When executed, these rules transit the obligation operational status from
state to state if the conditions of the transition are met. Because obligation express future
conditions that may not exist in the present time (the time of a request), we randomly
generate events (actions-based or temporal) that trigger obligation policies. These events
are generated using our Java application and fed into the model ontologies. After DL-
reasoning is complete, the execution of SWRL rules follows. These two steps derive all
the deductions needed to make the authorization decision. Figure 6.6 shows the results of
our obligation approach simulation. It displays the time needed for different number of
obligations’ enforcement. In Figure 6.7, we display the number of DL axioms required to
encode the different number of obligations.
Figure 6.6: Obligation Enforcement Time for Different Obligation Numbers.
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Figure 6.7: Number of Obligations versus Number of Axioms Processing Time.
We should note that our obligation enforcement does not change the CBAC authoriza-
tion framework we present in Chapter 4. One note about obligation enforcement is that any
access granted before activating the obligation can not be tracked back and be obligated
(there is no means to impose obligations on the already granted privileges).
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Several researchers have proposed access control strategies for protecting resources on the
networks. However, in dynamic environments, where subjects and resources are dynami-
cally changing their conditions, in addition to the changes in time and sensors’ updates, an
adaptable access control is needed.
We have shown that implementing a context-based authorization using semantic-based
techniques can provide an adaptable mechanism that satisfies the heterogeneity, dynamicity
and variability properties of dynamic environments. We also have shown that designing
context delegation mechanisms is feasible using semantic-based techniques. Furthermore,
we have shown that engaging obligation-based access policies into context-based access
control systems can be achieved using the same semantic-based techniques and we show
that involving obligation with CBAC does not change the basic design of the context-based
authorization framework. We also showed that these mechanisms can be developed to be
sound and adhere to the Least-Privilege principle.
In brief, we develop an authorization Context-Based Access Control framework to sat-
isfy the requirements inherently exist in dynamic environments. We also devise mecha-
nisms that provide delegation and obligation services. Our contribution can be summarized
in the following points:
• We develop specifications for a Context-Based Access Control policy language us-
ing OWL-DL and Jena rules. This specification is used to develop the authorization
framework that satisfies the dynamic environment requirements. In our framework,
we separate context operations from access authorization operations to reduce pro-
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cessing time for distributed networks’ devices and to gain modularity and flexibility.
• We develop a prototype implementation for our framework and show the results of
the implementation. We provide complexity analysis for the authorization framework
in its response to the requests and contrast the complexity against possible optimiza-
tion that can be applied on the framework. In Brief, we conclude this dissertation in
the following:
• We develop two context delegation mechanisms, GRANT and TRANSFER. In GR-
ANT delegation, a successful delegation operation allows delegated privileges to be
available to both the delegator and delegatee. In TRANSFER delegation, delegated
privileges are no longer available to the delegator.
• We build a semantic-based obligation mechanism and engage it within our authoriza-
tion framework. The mechanism associates the obligations with contexts depending
on the relatedness of the obligation to the request.
Future work can extend on the authorization, delegation and obligation mechanisms, using
the following directions:
• An interesting future direction is to incorporate trust management into our frame-
work. We plan to study the impact of honesty, trust level and trust negotiation con-
cepts on obligation and delegation mechanisms. For example, we can measure the
trust level of both the delegator and the delegatee. If they are equal or the trust level
of the delegatee is bigger than that of the delegator, delegation process proceeds,
otherwise, delegation request is denied.
• In our current work, we use the full context delegation to assign complete authoriza-
tion privilege to a delegatee. A promising future work will be to delegate a subcon-
text to assign sub-privilege to a delegatee. For example, assume that the context C
consists of subcontexts C1, C2 and C3 such that C is the full context and is given
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as C=C1uC2uC3. Assume that a holder of context C1 can access resources r1,r2,
holder of context C2 can access resource r3, and a holder of context C31 can access
resource r4,r5. Hence, holder of context C can access resources r1, r2, r3, r4 and r5.
If a delegator wants to delegate her/his privilege to access r3 to a delegatee, then (s)he
needs only to delegate subcontext C2 and not the full context C. This approach prop-
agates access privileges within one domain or across multiple domains. Delegating
subcontexts will also support recognition of the most frequently used subcontexts
and we can materialize them so that they will be available for use without the need
to redo the reasoning process.
• Investigating deployment options for our framework is also another future direction.
CBAC engine can be deployed on the same machine as context manager if they are
to be used within a small domain. If they are to be deployed separately for multiple
domains or for large domain, then an authentication service is needed between the
CBAC engine and the context manger. The responsibility of this service is to pro-
vide identity checking via authentication service between the CBAC engine and the
context manager to prevent impersonation attacks.
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